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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
In Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., the Fourth Circuit held that
a cause of action for violation of Title III accrues when the plaintiff discovers
or, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered the existence of
the surreptitious interception. 6" The Brown court's reliance on accrual prin-
ciples rather than tolling principles permitted the court to adopt the discovery
rule as a matter of federal law."s Since the discovery rule does not require
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant intentionally concealed the intercep-
tion, the rule should help to deter violation of Title III.66 The discovery rule,
therefore, provides protection for plaintiffs, especially important in states such
as Virginia that afford no common-law remedy for invasion of privacy.
67
BRADFORD FROST ENGLANDER
VII. CRIMINAL LAw & PROCEDURE
A. Determining Double Jeopardy Protection When Trial Court
Orders Dismissal Prior to Hearing Evidence
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides that the
government may not try any person more than once for the same offense.,
The constitutional mandate protects the defendant's interest in avoiding the
government's repeated attempts to convict a defendant who already has en-
dured the ordeal of trial.2 Additionally, the double jeopardy clause protects
64. 704 F.2d at 1304; see supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Cir-
cuit's adoption of discovery rule).
65. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 394 & n.38 (federal law governs accrual of federal
claims); supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (determination of time of accrual of federal
cause of action is federal question whereas state law generally governs tolling principles).
66. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discovery rule effectuates federal policy
expressed in Title III by relieving plaintiff of need to prove concealment).
67. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (Virginia does not recognize common-law
tort of invasion of privacy).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be "subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id. The phrase "life or limb"
refers to any criminal penalty. See Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170-73 (1873). The
double jeopardy clause protects defendants charged with misdemeanor or felony offenses. See
id. Outcomes of both jury and bench trials receive double jeopardy protection. United States
v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975). The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applies
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969);
see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process). Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court held that fifth
amendment double jeopardy immunity applied solely to defendants in federal prosecutions. Ben-
ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. at 795-96; see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937).
2. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). The double jeopardy clause of the
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the public's interest in law enforcement by providing the government with
one complete opportunity to convict a defendant whom the government duly
has charged with an offense.3 A trial that results in acquittal normally vin-
dicates both interests and bars further prosecution for the same offense."
When a defendant's first trial terminates prior to acquittal, the reviewing
court's twofold inquiry into the constitutionality of retrial focuses on whether
jeopardy has attached in the initial proceeding.' First, the reviewing court ad-
dresses the procedural issue of whether the defendant has been put to trial
before the trier of fact in a court with jurisdiction to enter final judgment.
6
Second, the reviewing court considers the substantive issue of whether the defen-
dant actually has risked a determination of guilt by the trier of fact.7 If the
fifth amendment evolved from the three common-law pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict,
and pardon, all of which prevented the retrial of a person previously acquitted, convicted, or
pardoned of the same offense. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 322, 339-42 (1975) (history
of fifth amendment double jeopardy protection). At common law, a defendant could avail himself
of the pleas only after a complete trial. Turner's Case, 89 Eng. Rep. 158, 158 (1676). By the
early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court established that a defendant could invoke double
jeopardy protection prior to conviction or acquittal. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579, 580 (1824). The resulting constitutional policy against multiple prosecutions derives from
established Anglo-American jurisprudence, which holds that the government should not be allowed
to amass its resources and powers to make repeated attempts to convict--an individual for an
alleged offense. Green, 355 U.S. at 187. Such attempts subject the defendant to increased expense,
anxiety, embarrassment, and delay and a greater chance of erroneous conviction. Id. at 187-88.
3. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 100 (1978); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 509 (1978) (double jeopardy protection recognizes society's interest in providing prosecution
one complete opportunity to convict lav violators). Society values its interest in punishing a guilty
defendant more than society values double jeopardy protection when the disposition of the first
trial resulted from reversible error. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (defen-
dant's immunity from punishment because of reversible error in trial proceedings is too costly
to society); cf. Wurzburg & Gross, Double Jeopardy: Dismissal and Government Appeal, 13
GoNz. L. REv. 337, 339 (1978) (society's right to punish guilty defendants corresponds to defen-
dants' double jeopardy protections).
4. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). An acquittal
represents a factual resolution of the offense charged. Id. Double jeopardy protection arises when
the trier of fact decides that the evidence warrants acquittal. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 671 (1896); accord Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam). But
cf. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (government appeal not barred when court
ordered acquittal on legal grounds prior to jury verdict).
5. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975); see United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion) (prohibition against repeated prosecutions for same of-
fense ensures due process protections and recognizes heavy personal strain of trial). The threat
of multiple punishment or successive prosecutions offends the double jeopardy clause. Wilson,
420 U.S. at 344.
6. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1948); see Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100,
133 (1904) (determination of guilt or innocence by court having jurisdiction bars retrial). Once
the trial court grants a motion to dismiss, that court loses jurisdiction to determine factual issues
presented by the charge. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975).
7. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). The premise that
the defendant avoids much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment that attend a trial,
as well as possible conviction, underlies the substantive part of the double jeopardy inquiry. See
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); supra note 2 (constitutional policy against
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disposition in the initial proceeding affirmatively resolves the procedural and
substantive issues, jeopardy has attached, barring further prosecution for the
offense originally charged.8
Recent Supreme Court inquiries into when double jeopardy protection
attaches following a dismissal have focused on the timing of the termination
of the initial proceeding.' In Serfass v. United States, " Lee v. United States,"
and Crist v. Bretz,'2 the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
jeopardy had attached in a trial proceeding when the trial court granted
dismissal.' 3 In Serfass, Lee, and Crist, the respective defendants made their
motions to dismiss after the trial proceedings had commenced but before the
courts had heard evidence.' 4 In Goolsby v. Hutto,I5 the Fourth Circuit relied
on Serfass, Lee, and Crist to determine whether jeopardy had attached in a
double jeopardy derives from established Anglo-American jurisprudence). The government does
not harass a defendant by retrying him after the defendant himself elects to terminate the initial
proceeding on legal grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 96 (1978). The defendant has a strong interest in obtaining an error-free adjudication of his
guilt pursuant to retrial just as society maintains a strong interest in punishing the guilty. United
States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). See Note, Double Jeopardy: When Is an Acquittal an
Acquittal, 20 B.C. L. Rav. 925, 950 (1979) (defendant's double jeopardy defense depends on
whether initial proceeding resolved factual elements in defendant's favor) [hereinafter cited as
Acquittal].
8. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978); see supra notes 6-7 (procedural and
substantive inquiry into whether jeopardy has attached).
9. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86 n.2 (1978). Trial courts employ dismissals as
a tool to supervise and administer legal and factual aspects of trial proceedings. Compare United
States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 741 (2d Cir.) (dismissal based on statute of limitations defense),
appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 934 (1949) with United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759, 760 (9th Cir.
1972) (case dismissed on grounds that literature was not obscene as matter of law). Trial courts
may grant dismissals at any stage of the trial proceeding. See Spriggs v. United States, 225 F.2d
865, 867 (9th Cir. 1955) (dismissal before trial began), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954 (1956); Wood-
ring v. United States, 311 F.2d 417, 424 (8th Cir.) (dismissal at close of evidence), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 913 (1963); see also Acquittal, supra note 7, at 926 (questioning whether procedural
and substantive variations in trial court disposition affect double jeopardy protection).
10. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
11. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
12. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
13. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 34
(1977); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 394 (1975). In Serfass, the district court entered
the pretrial order dismissing the indictment after examining records and an affidavit that set forth
evidence to be adduced at trial. 420 U.S. at 380. The Supreme Court held that jeopardy had
not attached because the petitioner had not been put to trial before the trier of fact. Id. at 394.
In Lee, the defendant moved to dismiss the information following the prosecutor's opening'giate-
ment. 432 U.S. at 25. The district court tentatively denied the motion but granted dismissal at
the close of evidence. Id. at 25-26. The Supreme Court held that jeopardy had not attached because
the district court granted the dismissal with the expectation that reprosecution would proceed
on a properly drawn information. Id. at 30-31. In Crist, a Montana trial court granted the pro-
secution's motion to dismiss after empaneling the jury. 437 U.S. at 30. The Supreme Court held
that jeopardy had attached at that point because double jeopardy protection incorporates a defen-
dant's interest in retaining a chosen jury. Id. at 38.
14. See Crist, 437 U.S. at 29-30; Lee, 432 U.S. at 25; Serfass, 420 U.S. at 379.
15. 691 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1982).
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nonjury, state trial after the trial court swore the first witness but before the
trial court heard evidence. 6
In Goolsby, an Alexandria, Virginia, police officer arrested Goolsby on
a charge related to a domestic matter.' 7 While searching Goolsby, the police
officer recovered fifteen coin-sized envelopes of marijuana from Goolsby's
pants pockets and socks.' 8 At a preliminary hearing on a felony charge of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,' 9 the Alexandria General
District Court determined that probable cause existed only for the lesser in-
cluded misdemeanor of simple possession.20 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth's
Attorney stated that he intended to obtain a grand jury indictment on the
felony and therefore moved for nolle prosequi of the misdemeanor.2 The
general district court denied the motion. 22 At trial later the same day, a dif-
ferent judge denied the Commonwealth's Attorney's second nolle prosequi
16. Id. at 199.
17. 529 F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1982).
18. 529 F. Supp. at 97.
19. 691 F.2d at 199; see VA. CODE § 18.2-248.1 (1950 & RepI. 1982) "(possession of more
than one half ounce of marijuana with intent to distribute is felony).
20. 691 F.2d at 199; see VA. CODE § 18.2-250.1 (1950 & RepI. 1982) (possession of con-
trolled substance is misdemeanor). Under Virginia law, general district courts have jurisdiction
to conduct preliminary hearings to determine whether sufficient cause exists to try the accused
for the offense charged. See VA. CODE § 16.1-127 (1950 & Repl. 1982), § 19.2-186 (1950 & RepI.
1983). Section 19.2-186 vests discretion in the general district court to determine the scope of
future proceedings against a defendant and the consequent double jeopardy effects of such fur-
ther proceedings. See id. § 19.2-186. If the general district court determines that sufficient cause
does not exist for a felony charge or a lesser included misdemeanor charge, the court may dismiss
all charges against a defendant. Id. If the general district court dismisses the charges for insuffi-
cient cause, however, the Commonwealth may seek a grand jury indictment on the charges. See
id. §§ 19.2-191, 19.2-216 (1950 & Repl. 1983). In Moore v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that double jeopardy principles did not bar a defendant's subsequent indictment on
charges following dismissal of the same charges at the general district court preliminary hearing.
218 Va. 388, 393, 237 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1977). The Moore court compared dismissal of charges
at the preliminary hearing to the procedure set forth in § 19.2-203 of the Virginia Code, which
permits the Commonwealth to correct irregularities on a defective indictment. 218 Va. at 394,
237 S.E.2d at 192; see VA. CODE § 19.2-203 (1950 & Repl. 1983). The general district court in
its discretion also may decide that sufficient cause exists only for a misdemeanor charge, over
which the general district court retains jurisdiction to try the defendant. VA. CODE § 19.2-186
(1950 & Repl. 1983). Finally, if the general district court determines that sufficient cause exists
for a felony charge, the general district court certifies the case to the appropriate circuit court. Id.
21. 691 F.2d at 199. Nolle prosequi is a declaration by a prosecuting officer that he will
not prosecute further. BLAcx's LAW DICTIONARY 945 (5th ed., 1979). Under Virginia law, the
court has sole discretion to grant nolle prosequi if the Commonwealth's Attorney shows good
cause. VA. CODE § 19.2-265.3 (1950 & Repl. 1983). In Goolsby, the Commonwealth's Attorney
announced his intention to obtain a grand jury indictment for the felony charge. 691 F.2d at
199; see VA. CODE §§ 19.2-202, 19.2-216 (1950 & Repl. 1983). In Virginia, a grand jury indict-
ment serves as an alternative to the general district court preliminary cause hearing. See VA.
CODE § 19.2-191 (1950 & Repl. 1983). To obtain an indictment, the Commonwealth's Attorney
presents a written accusation of the felony to a legally empaneled grand jury. Id. § 19.2-216.
If the grand jury determines that probable cause exists for the felony charge, the grand jury
returns a bill of indictment and trial follows. Id. § 19.2-202.
22. 691 F.2d at 199.
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motion.2 3 The Commonwealth's Attorney subsequently refused to present
evidence or question the complaining police officer, whom the general district
court had called and sworn as a witness.2 4 The judge dismissed sua sponte
the misdemeanor charge for lack of evidence.
2
1
Despite the general district court's dismissal of the misdemeanor charge,
the Commonwealth's Attorney obtained a grand jury indictment on the felony
charge. 26 The Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria found Goolsby guilty
of the felony," and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied review of Goolsby's
conviction. Goolsby petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia for habeas corpus relief, asserting that his conviction
violated his fifth and fourteenth amendment protections against double
jeopardy. 29 The Commonwealth argued that Goolsby had not been in danger
of conviction because no evidence had been introduced and thus jeopardy had
not attached. 30 The district court found, however, that Goolsby had been at
23. Id. at 199-200.
24. Id. at 200; see 529 F. Supp. at 96 (trial judge may call witnesses and enter verdict
without Commonwealth's participation). Section 15.1-8.1 of the Virginia Code grants authority
to Commonwealth's Attorneys to prosecute misdemeanors. See VA. CODE § 15.1-8.1 (1950 &
RepI. 1981). If the Commonwealth's Attorney decides not to call witnesses, the trial judge may
call any witness. See Hill v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 633, 639, 14 S.E. 330, 332 (1892) (trial
judge has discretion to call any witness not called by Commonwealth).
25. 691 F.2d at 200. In Goolsby, the judge dismissed the misdemeanor charge, stating that
jeopardy had attached. Id. For double jeopardy purposes, however, the trial judge's assessment
of his own action does not control subsequent classification of the disposition. United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7 (1971) (plurality opinion).
26. 691 F.2d at 200; see supra note 20 (procedure for obtaining grand jury indictment under
Virginia law).
27. 691 F.2d at 200; 529 F. Supp. at 94.
28. 691 F.2d at 200.
29. Id. Goolsby's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court and the Virginia Supreme Court's
subsequent denial of review exhausted Goolsby's remedies in Virginia state courts. See VA. CODE
§ 19.2-324 (1950 & Repl. 1983). Because Goolsby alleged violations of his constitutional rights,
the district court obtained jurisdiction over Goolsby's petition for writ of habeas corpus once
Goolsby had exhausted his remedies in Virginia state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966); 529
F. Supp. at 94. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (1966). 529 F. Supp. at 94, 97.
30. 691 F.2d at 200. The Commonwealth did not dispute that the double jeopardy clause
barred the felony prosecution if jeopardy had attached in the misdemeanor proceeding, even
though the Virginia statutes separately provided for a felony charge and a misdemeanor charge.
Id.; see VA. CODE §§ 18.2-248.1, 18.2-250.1 (1950 & Repl. 1982). Under Virginia law, the same
offense cannot constitute both a felony and a misdemeanor. VA. CODE § 18.2-8 (1950 & Repl.
1982); Benton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 570, 572, 16 S.E. 725, 725 (1893). In Blockburger v.
United States, the Supreme Court set forth the controlling standard for determining whether
the government may prosecute a defendant for a single act that violates two distinct statutory
provisions. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The Blockburger Court held that the government may pro-
secute a defendant for violation of two statutory provisions only when each statutory provision
prescribes a necessary element of the offense that the other statutory provision does not prescribe.
Id. The Blockburger standard applies for double jeopardy purposes to state court proceedings.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). Goolsby's conviction on the felony charge would have
required proof of possession, which is a necessary element of the misdemeanor offense. See VA.
CODE §§ 18.2-248.1, 18.2-250.1 (1950 & Repl. 1982). Goolsby therefore could not be tried on
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
risk of conviction and that jeopardy had attached.3 The district court therefore
granted Goolsby's petition for habeas corpus relief, 32 and the Commonwealth
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
3
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that jeopardy had
attached in the misdemeanor proceeding.3 4 The pivotal issue in Goolsby con-
cerned whether jeopardy had attached in the nonjury, state misdemeanor trial
when the general district court called and swore the complaining officer as
a witness.3 5 Because the Supreme Court had not considered a case that presented
the exact question, the Fourth Circuit examined the Court's language regard-
ing the attachment of jeopardy in nonjury trials in Serfass, Lee, and Crist. 36
In Serfass, the Supreme Court held that jeopardy had not attached in
a jury trial when the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
the indictment prior to the district court's empaneling and swearing of the
jury.37 In dictum, the Serfass Court stated that jeopardy attaches in a nonjury
the felony charge if jeopardy had attached in the trial court misdemeanor proceedings. See Brown,
432 U.S. at 166; VA. CODE § 18.2-8 (1950 & Repl. 1982). See generally Kirchheimer, The Act,
the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949) (analysis of substantive and pro-
cedural considerations that determine whether single act gives rise to more than one offense).
31. 691 F.2d at 200; 529 F. Supp. at 96. The Goolsby district court noted that the trial
judge elected to proceed to trial following the trial judge's denial of the Commonwealth's nolle
prosequi motion. 529 F. Supp. at 96; see VA. CODE § 19.2-265.3 (1950 & Repl. 1983) (court
has sole discretion to grant nolle prosequi motion). The district court further noted that the trial
judge had authority to call and question the witness and enter judgment without any participa-
tion from the Commonwealth's Attorney. 529 F. Supp. at 96; see supra note 23 (trial judge has
discretion to call witnesses not called by Commonwealth). The district court stated that the trial
court's decision to call and question the witness therefore amounted to an attempt to convict
Goolsby. 529 F. Supp. at 96. Because Goolsby had risked conviction, which the district court
termed the core of double jeopardy protection, the district court held that jeopardy had attached
in the trial court proceeding. Id.
32. 691 F.2d at 199; 529 F. Supp. at 96.
33. 691 F.2d at 200.
34. Id. at 202. In Goolsby, the Fourth Circuit stated that jeopardy attached at least when
the witness was sworn. Id. at 200. The Goolsby court recognized the discretion that § 19.2-186
vests in the general district court to determine at the preliminary hearing the course of proceedings
and the consequent attachment of jeopardy. See VA. CODE § 19.2-186 (1950 & Repl. 1983); supra
note 20 (discussion of general district court's discretion to determine course of proceedings against
defendant).
35. Id. at 199.
36. Id. at 200.
37. 420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975); see supra note 13 (jeopardy in Serfass did not attach upon
district court's examination of record prior to dismissing pretrial order). In Serfass, a grand jury
indicted the defendant for willfully failing to report for and submit to induction into the Armed
Forces. 420 U.S. at 379. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging
the local draft board's failure to state reasons for refusing to consider further his conscientious
objector application. Id. The district court dismissed the indictment because of the ambiguity
of the local draft board's statements in considering the merits of the defendant's conscientious
objector claim. Id. at 380-81. In a memorandum accompanying the district court's dismissal,
the court stated that it had relied on the affidavit accompanying the defendant's petition, defen-
dant's Selective Service file, and counsels' stipulations at oral argument on the motion to dismiss.
Id. at 379-80. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that the government's appeal
of the district court's dismissal violated the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 391-92. The Supreme
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trial when the court begins to hear evidence."' In Lee, the Supreme Court
held that jeopardy had not attached in a nonjury trial when the district court
granted dismissal at the close of evidence. 39 While noting the Serfass Court's
statement that jeopardy attaches in a nonjury trial when the court begins to
hear evidence, 0 the Lee Court held that jeopardy had not attached because
the defendant initially made his motion to dismiss the information prior to
the district court's hearing evidence. 4 ' Finally, in Crist, the Supreme Court
relied on Serfass to hold that jeopardy had attached in a jury trial when the
trial court empaneled and swore the jury.42 In reaching its decision, the Crist
Court also noted the Serfass Court's statement that jeopardy attaches in a
nonjury trial when the court begins to hear evidence.43 However, the Crist
Court recharacterized the Serfass language by stating that jeopardy attaches
in a nonjury trial when the court swears the first witness.44 Under the facts
Court held that the defendant never had risked a determination of guilt in the pretrial hearings
and jeopardy therefore had not attached. Id. The Supreme Court further held that the district
court's dismissal following examination of the record and oral stipulations did not amount to
an acquittal on the merits of the charges contained in the indictment, which would have barred
the government's appeal of the dismissal. Id. at 392. The Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant never had risked conviction and jeopardy therefore never had attached. Id.
38. Id. at 388.
39. 432 U.S. 23, 34 (1977); see supra note 13 (jeopardy did not attach when district court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss at close of evidence). In Lee, the information filed in
the district court failed to allege an essential element of the theft charge against petitioner. 432
U.S. at 25. Following the prosecutor's opening statement at the bench trial in federal district
court, the defendant's lawyer moved to dismiss the information. Id. The district court postponed
ruling on the defendant's motion until the district court had time to consider fully the motion.
Id. at 26. Without objection by defense counsel, the trial proceeded pending later consideration
of the motion to dismiss. Id. After the government presented its case and the defense rested
without presenting any evidence, the court granted the earlier motion to dismiss because of the
defective information. Id. Stating that he had no doubt that the defendant was guilty, the judge
held that federal case precedent required dismissal of the information for failure to allege suffi-
ciently the requisite elements of the offense. Id. at 26-27. The Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy clause did not bar the defendant's subsequent conviction pursuant to an indictment
alleging the necessary elements of the offense. Id. at 34. The Lee Court reasoned that the dismissal
of the information did not result from a judgment that the government could never prosecute
the defendant. Id. at 30. The Lee Court noted that the initial proceedings terminated at the defen-
dant's request and that the defendant's delay in moving for dismissal of the information caused
the court's delay in granting the dismissal. Id. at 33-34. The Supreme Court therefore held that
jeopardy had not attached because the dismissal did not determine the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence, even though the dismissal occurred at the end of trial. Id.
40. Id. at 27 n.3; see Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388.
41. 432 U.S. at 34.
42. 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978). In Crist, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the infor-
mation after the trial court empaneled and swore the jury. Id. at 29-30. The trial court denied
the government's motion to amend the information, but subsequently granted the government's
motion to dismiss the information. Id. at 30. The Supreme Court stated that the federal rule
that jeopardy attaches when the trial court empanels and swears the jury applies to state courts
as part of double jeopardy protection. Id. at 38. The Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy
clause barred the defendants' subsequent prosecution and conviction. See id.
43. See id. at 37 n.15; see Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388.
44. 437 U.S. at 37 n.15; accord Willhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S. 1323, 1326 (1980) (Bren-
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presented in Goolsby, however, the Fourth Circuit found it impossible to deter-
mine for double jeopardy purposes a constitutional difference between swear-
ing a witness and hearing evidence. 45 The Goolsby court then examined the
reasoning in Serfass, Lee, and Crist.46 The Goolsby court concluded that jeopar-
dy had attached when the trial court swore the witness because the trial court
at that point had subjected Goolsby to the risk of conviction.
4 7
Relying on Serfass, the Goolsby court reasoned that the Commonwealth's
refusal to elicit testimony from the witness resembled a witness' failure to
provide evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt, which the Goolsby
court noted requires a defendant's acquittal.4 8 Because the Commonwealth's
refusal to elicit testimony precluded the general district court from determin-
ing whether the witness' evidence would support Goolsby's conviction on the
misdemeanor charge, the Fourth Circuit held that jeopardy attached when
the general district court swore the witness.4 9 The Fourth Circuit further held
that the Commonwealth, in obtaining the grand jury indictment on the felony
charge, had made repeated attempts to convict Goolsby." The Fourth Circuit
specifically quoted Serfass in stating that the underlying function of the double
jeopardy clause is to prevent the government from making repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense.' The Fourth Circuit thus af-
nan, Circuit Justice) (federal rule provides that jeopardy attaches in bench trial when trial court
swears first witness).
45. 691 F.2d at 200. The Fourth Circuit specifically rejected the Commonwealth's distinc-
tion between merely swearing the witness and hearing his testimony. Id. In an analogous case,
the District of Columbia Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. Newman v. United States, 410
F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969). The Newman court held
that jeopardy had not attached in a nonjury trial when the trial court entered a nolle prosequi
motion after the trial court swore all the witnesses but before the first witness began to testify.
410 F.2d at 260. The triaJ court customarily swore all witnesses as a group, after which the trial
court heard pretrial motions. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit held that under the circumstances,
collective swearing of witnesses constituted an administrative procedure for the trial court's con-
venience. Id. The Neiwman court agreed with the government's distinction between collective swear-
ing of witnesses for administrative convenience and swearing of a witness who actually takes
the stand to testify after trial commences. Id. In Goolsby, the general district court had sworn
the witness immediately prior to the witness' anticipated testimony, and the witness actually had
taken the stand to testify. See 691 F.2d at 200. In most cases, a distinction between swearing
the witness and hearing evidence will not arise because nothing else usually occurs between the
two events. Blondes v. Maryland, 273 Md. 435, 446, 330 A.2d 169, 174 (1975). The American
Law Institute proposes that jeopardy attach at the swearing of the first witness. MODa. PENAL
CODE § 1.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
46. 691 F.2d at 201.
47. Id. at 200.
48. Id. at 201-202.
49. Id. at 202.
50. Id. The Goolsby court found that the Commonwealth was attempting to circumvent
the general district court's statutory power to grant motions for nolle prosequi because the Com-
monwealth disagreed with the general district court's disposition of the case. Id. at 201-202.
51. Id. at 200 (quoting Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975)). The Serfass
Court cited Green v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy
clause protects a defendant from the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of repeated prosecu-
tions, as well as from the enhanced possibility upon retrial that an innocent defendant might
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firmed the district court's decision that Goolsby's second trial and conviction
violated the double jeopardy clause.2
In Goolsby, the Fourth Circuit confronted the dilemma that may arise
when a court's double jeopardy inquiry focuses on the timing of a dismissal
rather than the substantive reasons for the dismissal. 3 Until Goolsby, federal
circuit courts found the language of Serfass adequate to resolve double jeopardy
inquiries."4 Under the unusual circumstances of Goolsby, however, the Fourth
Circuit would have been forced to choose between the conflicting characteriza-
tions of Serfass in Lee and Crist.5 The Fourth Circuit recognized that such
a choice would amount to determining constitutionally mandated double jeopar-
dy protection by an arbitrary exercise of line drawing16 and therefore turned
to the substantive analysis implicit in the holdings of Serfass, Lee and Crist."
be found guilty. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 385; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
The Green quotation operates as the definitive appraisal of the underlying purposes and policies
of the double jeopardy clause. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980)
(quoting Green for statement of policy of double jeopardy protection); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.
28, 35 (1978) (same); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (same); United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (same); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 343 (1975) (same); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (same).
52. 691 F.2d at 202.
53. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 36-37 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice
Rehnquist noted that the tendency to rely on a "bright-line" analysis leads to an oversimplifica-
tion of double jeopardy issues. Id.
54. See Harris v. Young, 607 F.2d 1081, 1084 n.3 (4th Cir. 1979) (jeopardy attaches in
nonjury trial when court begins to hear evidence), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 1025 (1980). The Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have quoted the Serfass Court's language for
the proposition that jeopardy attaches in a nonjury trial when the court begins to hear evidence.
See, e.g., United States v. Grabinski, 674 F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 1982) (dismissal of charge for
failure to file income tax return for lack of personal jurisdiction did not bar subsequent trial
in court of competent jurisdiction), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 67 (1983); Klobuchir v. Pennsylvania,
639 F.2d 966, 970 (3d Cir.) (double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial of first degree murder
indictment following vacation of plea-bargained third degree murder conviction), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1031 (1981); United States v. Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1004, 1004 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (trial
court's grant of defendant's motion for dismissal of wire and mail fraud charges does not bar
further prosecution of such charges), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Stricklin,
591 F.2d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir.) (government may use as basis for different charge facts underlying
marijuana possession charges that were dismissed for violation of speedy trial right), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 963 (1979); United States v. Smith, 584 F.2d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 1978) (jeopardy attach-
ment does not bar retrial upon defendant's successful appeal from conviction of controlled substance
violations), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1367-68, 1367
n.7 (9th Cir.) (extradition order does not constitute final judgment for double jeopardy pur-
poses), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978). Like the Court in Crist, the Third and Fifth Circuits
also have cited Serfass for the proposition that jeopardy attaches in a nonjury trial when the
first witness is sworn. See Virgin Islands v. George, 680 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1982) (criminal
trial commences when jury selection begins); United States v. Garcia, 589 F.2d 249, 251 (5th
Cir.) (trial court's dismissal of indictment for drug-related charges following defendants' withdrawal
of guilty pleas does not invoke double jeopardy protection), cert. denied 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
55. See 691 F.2d at 200; supra note 40 and accompanying text (Lee Court's characteriza-
tion of Serfass language regarding jeopardy attachment); supra note 44 and accompanying text
(Crist Court's recharacterization of Serfass language regarding jeopardy attachment).
56. See Crist, 437 U.S. at 37.
57. 691 F.2d at 201-202.
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The Goolsby court first acknowledged the importance of the procedural
context in which the Supreme Court decided Serfass, Lee, and Crist." The
Goolsby court recognized that the result in all three decisions depended on
whether the trial proceedings had reached a point where the trier of fact had
jurisdiction to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence." Therefore, the
timing of the dismissal was crucial in determining the outcome of Serfass,
Lee, and Crist.66 The Goolsby court next considered the substantive context
of the Serfass, Lee, and Crist decisions.6 ' The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
the importance of the timing of the dismissals in Serfass, Lee, and Crist
depended on whether the courts had subjected the respective defendants to
the risk of conviction once the courts had jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter to determine the defendants' guilt or innocence.62 In Goolsby,
the trial court judge who ordered the dismissal had express statutory authoriza-
tion to determine Goolsby's guilt or innocence on the misdemeanor charge.63
Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that jeopardy had attached because the pro-
ceeding had reached a point at which the trial court could subject Goolsby
to the risk of conviction.
64
The soundness of the Fourth Circuit's decision that jeopardy had attached
when the trial court dismissed the charges against Goolsby depends on whether
the dismissal invoked the necessary protections of the double jeopardy clause.
In Serfass, the Supreme Court stated that the double jeopardy inquiry into
whether the trial court's dismissal bars retrial following a finding that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence.6" By
relying on the reasoning of Serfass, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter and then con-
sidered whether Goolsby actually had risked conviction in the trial court
proceeding. 66 The Goolsby court then examined the substantive impact of the
58. Id. at 200.
59. Id.
60. See id, The Supreme Court'i holdings in Serfass, Lee, and Crist rest on the threshold
determination that the trial had proceeded to a point in time when the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence, at which time jeopardy could attach. Crist, 437
U.S. at 38; Lee, 432 U.S. at 30; Serfass, 420 U.S. at 394; see Acquittal, supra note 8, at 929
(double jeopardy attachment depends on procedural timing of trial court discharge). The Crist
Court held that concern with the finality of judgments, concern with limiting the possibility of
harassment of defendant through multiple trials, and concern with the defendant's right to con-
tinue with a chosen jury combined to establish that jeopardy attaches when the trial court em-
panels and swears the jury. 437 U.S. at 38. In Serfass, the Court held that termination of pro-
secution prior to trial neither subjects the defendant to the hazards of trial and possible convic-
tion nor affords the prosecutor two chances to persuade a trier of fact of the defendant's guilt.
420 U.S. at 391.
61. 691 F.2d at 201.
62. Id.
63. 691 F.2d at 199 n.1; see VA. CODE § 19.2-186 (1950 & Supp. 1983) (trial judge has
jurisdiction to try misdemeanor offenses); supra note 20 (description of procedure to determine
whether sufficient cause exists for misdemeanor and felony charges).
64. 691 F.2d at 202.
65. 420 U.S. at 390.
66. 691 F.2d at 200.
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dismissal order.6" In Lee, the Supreme Court stated that the double jeopardy
clause bars retrial if the dismissal order contemplates an end to all prosecu-
tion of the defendant for the offense charged." Lee and subsequent Supreme
Court cases reaffirmed that the double jeopardy clause bars further prosecu-
tion after a disposition based on failure of proof." The Goolsby court's review
of the general district court's order demonstrates that the Commonwealth's
refusal to present evidence or elicit testimony from the witness prompted the
dismissal."0 The resemblance of the trial court's dismissal of the misdemeanor
charges to a disposition based on failure of proof indicates that the trial court
contemplated an end to all prosecution of the charges against Goolsby.' If
failure of proof did not bar repeated prosecution for the same offense, the
government might seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's
guilt." More importantly, a second trial following dismissal for failure of proof
further subjects the defendant to the chance of erroneous conviction, the
prevention of which is an underlying policy of double jeopardy protection."
The Goolsby court's analysis that the general district court had subjected
Goolsby to the risk of conviction warrants the Fourth Circuit's holding that
jeopardy had attached in the general district court proceeding." The Fourth
Circuit's decision also conforms to the constitutional principle that a defen-
dant not suffer more than once the ordeal of trial and the consequent possibility
of erroneous conviction."
67. See id.
68. 432 U.S. at 30. If the trial court's ruling represents a resolution of the factual elements
of the offense in the defendant's favor, double jeopardy protection bars retrial. Id. at 30, 30
n.8; see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (courts may not
review resolution of factual elements of offense); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370
(1975) (double jeopardy clause bars further proceedings to resolve factual elements of offense
when trial could have resulted in defendant's conviction but terminated in defendant's favor).
69. 432 U.S. at 30. When the trial court grants dismissal on the ground, correct or not,
that the defendant cannot be convicted on the proof elicited, the double jeopardy clause bars
further prosecution. Id. Society's interest in enforcing its laws does not extend to retrying a defendant
when the government has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it can assemble
to prove its case. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). The government bears absolute
responsibility for the presentation of its factual case. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,
74-77 (1978). The prosecution's failure to adduce sufficient evidence of a crime results in double
jeopardy protection against retrial. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43 (1981). The double
jeopardy protection against retrial that follows a determination that the evidence at trial cannot
sustain a guilty verdict applies fully to state criminal proceedings. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S.
19, 24 (1978).
70. 691 F.2d at 199-202.
71. See id. at 202. In Goolsby, the Fourth Circuit stated that Goolsby was subjected to
conviction or acquittal when the trial court called and swore the first witness. Id. The Fourth
Circuit held that the fact that the witness did not give any evidence required Goolsby's acquittal.
Id. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, expressly characterized the trial court's dismissal of the charges
against Goolsby as an acquittal. Id.
72. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. at 35.
73. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); supra notes 51 & 60 (policies
underlying double jeopardy protection).
74. See supra notes 58-64 (Goolsby analysis).
75. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); supra notes 51 & 60 (policies
underlying double jeopardy protection).
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Although recent Supreme Court decisions have favored society's interest
in obtaining convictions against violators of the law,76 the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Goolsby will not operate to denigrate that interest. Unlike the Lee
disposition, in which the legal insufficiency of the information precluded an
opportunity to resolve the issues that determine guilt or innocence,77 the general
district court proceedings afforded the Commonwealth a full and fair oppor-
tunity to convict Goolsby.78 In Lee, the defendant avoided the risk of convic-
tion by relying on procedural defects unrelated to the determination of his
guilt or innocence.7 9 When a defendant himself has avoided a resolution of
the issue of guilt or innocence, society's interest in insuring that the guilty
are punished outweighs the defendant's interest in avoiding multiple
prosecutions.8" In Goolsby, however, the defendant did not seek to avoid a
determination of his guilt or innocence. The Commonwealth's refusal to par-
ticipate in the trial proceedings was the only factor preventing a resolution
of the issues involved and therefore was tantamount to a resolution of the
factual issues in Goolsby's favor.' When a trial court has subjected a defen-
dant to the risk of conviction and has resolved the issue of guilt or innocence
in his favor, double jeopardy protection prevails. 82
The Goolsby decision clearly signals that the government cannot use
statutory alternatives to obtain a second chance to convict a defendant any
more than a defendant can rely on procedural defects to avoid prosecution.
8 3
The statute prescribing a method of prosecution furthers society's interest in
law enforcement by providing express means to obtain a conviction. 4 However,
76. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (government appeals from midtrial
dismissals requested by defendant significantly advance public interest in assuring that courts
subject defendants to fair judgment on merits of case); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470-471
(1973) (court should be less willing to accord defendant's interest great weight if court determines
that societal interests indicate desirability of retrial).
77. See 432 U.S. at 30.
78. See 691 F.2d at 200-201. A prosecutor's full and fair opportunity to convict a defen-
dant is necessary to vindicate societal interests in punishing the guilty. See Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
79. 432 U.S. at 25-26. In Lee, the defendant based his motion to dismiss the information
on incomplete allegations in the information. Id. at 25. Upon dismissing the information, the
district court expressly stated that the government had proved the defendant's guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt. Id. at 26. The district court stated, however, that federal law required the
government to include allegations of all elements in charges. Id. at 26-27. The district court therefore
dismissed the information. Id.; see supra note 38 (summary of Lee).
80. See supra note 68 (importance of double jeopardy protection in safeguarding society's
interests).
81. 691 F.2d at 200, 202.
82. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1978). Constitutional protections pursuant
to the double jeopardy clause are mandatory and are not subject to judicial discretion. Id.
83. See 691 F.2d at 201-202. The double jeopardy clause forbids affording the prosecution
a second opportunity to supply evidence that it failed to adduce in the first proceeding. Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). Otherwise, unscrupulous prosecutors might deliberately
sacrifice the first trial to improve the government's presentation at a second trial. See Acquittal,
supra note 7, at 942.
84. See VA. CODE § 16.1-127 (1950 & Repl. 1982); id. § 19.2-186 (1950 & Repl. 1983);
supra notes 20 & 21 (statutory procedure for obtaining felony charge in general district court).
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the constitutional principle that protects society's interest also protects a defen-
dant's interest in avoiding repeated attempts at conviction.85 The double
jeopardy clause will not allow the government to disregard one statutory pro-
vision for conviction in favor of another statutory provision that also pro-
vides for conviction simply because the government has failed to achieve the
desired result under the first statute.6
The Goolsby decision serves as a sensible model for subsequent double
jeopardy inquiries within the Fourth Circuit. Although the Fourth Circuit
clearly held the Commonwealth responsible for its inability to convict the
defendant, 7 Goolsby assures that society's interest in law enforcement remains
unhampered as long as the government utilizes lawful opportunities to con-
vict a defendant. 8 By focusing on the resolution of factual issues in determin-
ing whether jeopardy has attached, Goolsby safeguards a potential defendant's
interest in avoiding the anxiety of repeated trials for the same offense.89 Finally,
Goolsby advises courts to determine whether trial proceedings actually sub-
jected a defendant to the risk of conviction. Instead of relying on procedural
mandates that might sacrifice the legitimate interests of either society or a
defendant by failing to account for varying factual circumstances, the Goolsby
decision provides an analytical framework that fully and fairly protects the
interests of both society and the defendant.8 '
LoUIsE J. BROWNER
B. The Effect of Mental Deficiency on Determining the
Voluntariness of a Juvenile Confession
The fifth amendment protects criminal defendants from compulsory
self-incrimination.' The protection against compulsory self-incrimination
85. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1975) (double jeopardy clause pro-
hibits repeated attempts at prosecution); supra notes 5 & 7 (constitutional policy against repeated
attempts at prosecution). Compare supra note 3 (society's interest accommodated by double jeopardy
clause) with supra note 2 (defendant's interest protected by double jeopardy clause).
86. See 691 F.2d at 201-202 (effect of Commonwealth's refusal to participate in Goolsby's
misdemeanor trial); supra notes 20 & 21 (statutory procedure for obtaining conviction); supra
note 51 (statement of policy of double jeopardy protection).
87. 691 F.2d at 201-202.
88. See supra note 3 (discussion of society's interest in obtaining convictions).
89. See 691'F.2d at 201 (examination of factual issues in Serfass, Lee, and Crist); supra
notes 67 & 68 (discussion of factual context in which jeopardy may attach at trial).
90. See supra notes 69 & 73 (defendant's interest in twice avoiding risk of conviction).
91. See supra note 3 (double jeopardy clause protects society's interests).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that no person can be forced
to be a witness against himself in a criminal trial. Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted this
right as protecting the criminally accused from being compelled to provide the state with in-
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extends to involuntary, pretrial confessions.2 The Supreme Court has defined
involuntary confessions as confessions that are not the product of a person's
own free will2 If a court finds that a particular confession is involuntary,
the court may not admit that confession as evidence at trial. 4 Generally, courts
have held that no particular factor is determinative of whether a particular
confession is involuntary.' Instead, courts have adopted a totality of the cir-
cumstances test to determine the voluntariness of a confession.' In applying
criminating evidence. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 302-303 (1967).
2. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). In Bram, the Court considered
whether a defendant's pretrial confession was voluntary. Id. The Supreme Court noted a confes-
sion must be voluntary before a court can admit the confession as evidence. Id. The Supreme
Court stated that the fifth amendment governed the admission of pretrial confessions by a criminal
defendant. Id. The Supreme Court found a long established tradition in the Anglo-Saxon sense
of justice that a person accused of a crime could not be compelled to testify against himself.
Id. at 545-61. From this established tradition, the Supreme Court concluded that a pretrial con-
fession induced by threat or promise was not voluntary since such a confession is not freely given,
and therefore was not admissible. Id. at 562-65.
3. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959). In Spano, the defendant confessed
to murder after 11 hours of interrogation. Id. at 322-23. A friend of the defendant who was
also a police cadet had urged the defendant to confess. Id. at 323. The Supreme Court concluded
that the confession was not voluntary emphasizing that the police pressured the defendant and
falsely aroused the defendant's sympathy. Id. at 323; see Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433,
435 (1958) (courts must examine facts to determine if confession resulted from defendant's exer-
cise of free will) rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 479 (1965); Michaud v. Robbins, 424 F.2d
971, 974 (Ist Cir. 1970) (voluntariness determination involves finding whether confession was
result of defendant's overborne will).
4. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (use of involuntary confession at
trial to convict defendant violated due process); Hopt v. People of the Territory of Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (courts may admit only voluntary confessions into evidence since involun-
tary confessions are inherently unreliable); see also McCoy & Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due
Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 887, 938 (1980) (excluding coerced statements
from trial removes high risk of inaccuracy inherent in any coerced testimony).
5. See Sullivan v. State of Alabama, 666 F.2d 478, 482 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (mental deficiency
alone is not determinative of voluntariness); United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 450 F.2d
517, 519-520 (3rd Cir. 1971) (confession is not per se involuntary merely because confessor was
juvenile); United States ex rel. Lathan v. Deegan, 450 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir.) (mere deception
in attempting to elicit confession by police during interrogation does not invalidate confession),
cert. denied. 450 U.S. 1071 (1971); Wood v. United States, 317 F.2d 736, 738 (10th Cir. 1963)
(fact that defendant confessed while in police custody does not automatically render confession
involuntary); Fant v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 457, 459 (W.D. Va. 1969) (intoxication alone does
not render confession involuntary).
6. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). The Gallegos Court stated that no ab-
solute guide exists to determine whether a confession is voluntary. Id. at 55. The Supreme Court
further stated that a court must examine all the factors surrounding the confession in deciding
voluntariness. Id. at 54-55; see Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (voluntariness determina-
tion requires court to examine all factors surrounding confession); Iverson v. North Dakota,
480 F.2d 414, 424 (8th Cir.) (court must use totality of circumstances test when determining volun-
tariness of defendant's confession), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044 (1973); United States v. Miller
453 F.2d 634, 635 (4th Cir.) (totality of circumstances test is proper method for determining
voluntariness of confession), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972); West v. United States, 399 F.2d
467, 469 (5th Cir.) (all factors of confession are important in determining voluntariness), cert
denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1968).
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the totality of the circumstances test, courts consider all the existing cir-
cumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether a particular defen-
dant confessed voluntarily.7 Important factors in determining whether a con-
fession is voluntary include police conduct, 8 physical violence, 9 mental
coercion, 10 age of the confessor,"I and mental capacity of the confessor.' 2 In
Vance v. Bordenkircher,'3 the Fourth Circuit recently considered the volun-
tariness of the pretrial confession of a mentally deficient juvenile, and held
that the confession was voluntary.' 4
7. See supra note 6 (courts consider all factors of confession in determining voluntariness);
infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (list of factors courts consider in applying totality of
circumstances test to voluntariness determination).
8. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). In Haley, the police arrested the defen-
dant, a 15 year old boy, at midnight and took him to police headquarters. Id. at 598. The police
did not inform the defendant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel
present during interrogation. Id. The police questioned the defendant continuously for five hours,
using alternating shifts of interrogators. Id. At the end of the five hour period, the defendant
confessed to murder. Id. The Supreme Court considered the improper police conduct while inter-
rogating the defendant a significant factor in ruling that the confession was involuntary. Id. at
599; see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (examination of factors relevant to evaluation
of police conduct).
9. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936). In Brown, the police tied the defen-
dant to a tree and whipped him in an effort to get the defendant to confess to murder. Id. When
the defendant would not confess, the police released the defendant. Id. Several days later two
deputies picked up the defendant at his house and transported him to jail. Id. On the way to
the jail the deputies stopped and again severly whipped the defendant. Id. The defendant con-
fessed after being told that the whipping would continue until he confessed. Id. at 281-82. The
Supreme Court held that one reason the confession was involuntary was that the police used
physical violence in securing the confession. Id. at 283.
10. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 (1977). In Brewer, the defendant made a
confession to the police regarding the location of a missing girl's body. Id. at 394. The defendant
made the confession only after the police investigator had elicited sympathy from the defendant
by informing the defendant of the emotional condition of the parents of the missing girl. Id.
at 393-94. The Supreme Court noted that the mental coercion used by the investigator in Brewer
was an important factor in determining that the defendant's confession was involuntary. Id. at 401.
11. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). In Haley, the Court reasoned that a court
must use special care when determining the voluntariness of a juvenile confession since juveniles
cannot be judged by the standards of adult maturity. Id. at 599. The Supreme Court concluded
that the defendant's youth was an important factor in determining that the defendant's confes-
sion was involuntary. Id. at 599-600; see also infra notes 77 and accompanying text (age is factor
in voluntariness determination).
12. See Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966). In Davis, the trial
court relied primarily on a defendant's confession in finding the defendant guilty. Id. at 741.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the defendant's confession
was voluntary. Id. at 741-42. The Davis Court examined the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the confession including the fact that the defendant had a third grade education and
was mentally impaired. Id. The court also noted that the police had subjected the defendant
to a lengthy interrogation prior to the confession. Id. at 745-47. The Supreme Court held that
the defendant's impaired mental capacity was an important factor in finding that the defendant's
confession was involuntary. Id. at 752; see also infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (mental
deficiency is factor in voluntariness determination).
13. 692 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 981-82.
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The Vance case involved two unsolved murders that occurred in Scar-
boro, West Virginia.in 1961.5 Early in 1962, the police arrested fifteen year
old Arnold Vance on matters unrelated to the unsolved murders and transported
Vance to the police station. 6 The police informed Vance's mother of the arrest
but she chose not to accompany her son to the police station. 7 At the police
station the police informed Vance of the right to remain silent and the right
to have an attorney present during any interrogation. 8 After interrogating
Vance concerning the unrelated incident, the chief of police routinely ques-
tioned Vance about the unsolved murders. 19 Whea Vance's responses to the
murder inquiries aroused the suspicion of the police, the police placed Vance
in jail. " The chief of police called in the chief investigator in the unsolved
murders to assist in interrogating Vance.2' Vance orally confessed to commit-
ting the murders after approximately one hour of police questioning.22
Approximately, one and one-half hours after Vance made the oral confes-
sion, the police obtained a written statement from Vance admitting that he
committed the murders. 23 Intermittent questioning continued for almost five
more hours until approximately 2:00 a.m., resulting in a second written
confession.2" At the defendant's trial the prosecution attempted to introduce
both of the defendant's confessions as evidence.25 During the course of the
trial the court conducted a hearing on the voluntriness of the defendant's con-
fession and found that the confession was voluntary.26 The trial court therefore
15. Id. at 979.
16. Id. In Vance, the police arrested the defendant for breaking and entering. Id. The Fourth
Circuit noted that the defendant was moderately mentally deficient. Id. at 980. The defendant
had an IQ of 62, which is the functional equivalent of a mental age of nine and one-half years.
Id. at 980; see infra notes 102-103 (discussing the age at which juveniles are capable of waiving
rights).
17. 692 F.2d at 979; see infra note 83 (courts have emphasized absence or presence of parents
at juvenile interrogations when determining voluntariness).
18. 692 F.2d at 979.
19. Id.
20. Id. In Vance, the chief of police testified that during the interrogation about the un-
solved murders the defendant responded strangely to the murder inquiries and aroused the police
chief's suspicions. Id. The police put the defendant in jail charging him with breaking and enter-
ing because of the police chief's suspicions. Vance v. Bordenkircher, 505 F. Supp. 135, 137 (N.D.
W.Va. 1981).
21. 505 F. Supp. at 137.
22. 692 F.2d at 979. In Vance, the police began questioning the defendant at approximately
6:30 p.m., and the defendant confessed orally sometime between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Id.
23. Id. The defendant in Vance signed a written statement in which he confessed to the
murders at approximately 9:15 p.m. Id. The defendant also eventually drew a floor plan of the
house where the murders occurred. Id.
24. Id. In Vance, the police continued questioning the defendant after the original confes-
sion to determine whether another person had been involved in the murders. 505 F. Supp. at 137.
25. 692 F.2d at 979.
26. 505 F. Supp. at 138. In Vance, the district court stated that the original trial judge
conducted a thorough hearing on the issue of voluntariness outside the presence of the jury.
Id. The district court opinion mentioned no specific details of what had occurred at the hearing.
See id.
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admitted the confession into evidence.27 The jury convicted the defendant and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.
28
The defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.29 The defendant
based his habeas corpus petition on the ground that the original trial court
improperly admitted his confession as evidence.30 The defendant argued that
the fifth amendment required the exclusion of the confession since the confes-
sion was involuntary.3 The defendant contended the confession was involun-
tary since the defendant could not have confessed voluntarily due to his youth
and low mentality.32 The district court denied defendant's habeas corpus
petition 33 holding that the defendant's confession was voluntary. 4 On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court ruling that the defendant's confes-
sion was voluntary.35
The Fourth Circuit began the analysis of the voluntariness of the defen-
dant's confession by noting that a court should examine the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether a defendant's confession is
voluntary.36 The court noted that one factor to examine as part of the totality
of the circumstances test was the age of the defendant. 37 The Fourth Circuit
considered age an important factor since the Supreme Court has said that
juvenile confessions must be viewed with special scrutiny. 38 The Fourth Cir-
cuit noted however that while youth is an important factor in the voluntariness
determination, age alone is not determinative of the issue of voluntariness.
3 9
The Fourth Circuit stated that courts also should consider mental deficiency
as a factor in the voluntariness determination." The Vance court cited a
previous Fourth Circuit case concerning a mentally deficient confessor in which
27. Id.
28. 692 F.2d at 980.
29. 505 F. Supp. at 136.
30. Id.
31. 692 F.2d at 979; see supra note 2 (involuntary confessions are not admissible at trial);
see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (involuntary confession cannot be ad-
mitted at trial since involuntary confessions are inherently unreliable).
32. 692 F.2d at 980; see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (age alone is not deter-
minative of voluntariness of confession; infra notes 79-104 (juvenile with low mental capacity
is not capable of confessing voluntarily).
33. 505 F. Supp. at 138.
34. Id.
35. 692 F.2d at 981-82.
36. Id. at 980; see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (totality of circumstances is
method courts should use when determining voluntariness).
37. 692 F.2d at 980; see infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussion of effect of
defendant's age on voluntariness of confession).
38. 692 F.2d at 980. The Supreme Court in Haley v. Ohio stated that juvenile confessions
must be examined with special scrutiny. 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); see infra notes 81-82 (discus-
sion of Haley Court's reasoning concerning the effect of age on voluntariness of confessions).
39. 692 F.2d at 980. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (age alone is not deter-
minative on the issue of voluntariness).
40. 692 F.2d at 981. See infra notes 87-92 (discussion of mental deficiency as factor courts
examine when determining voluntariness).
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the Fourth Circuit held that mental deficiency alone does not render a confes-
sion involuntary.' The Fourth Circuit then concluded that neither the age
nor the mental deficiency of the defendant is solely determinative of the issue
of voluntariness.
42
After noting that youth and mental deficiency do not as a matter of law
render a confession involuntary, the Fourth Circuit examined the police con-
duct during the defendant's interrogation. 43 The court stressed the good con-
duct of the police when interrogating the defendant.14 The court specifically
noted that the defendant was given food during the interrogation, and that
the defendant never requested an end to the questioning. 45 The court strongly
emphasized that the police only intermittenly questioned the defendant.16 The
court further emphasized that neither of the defendant's confessions had
occurred at the end of an extended interrogation, and that the defendant oral-
ly confessed shortly after the police began questioning the defendant about
the murders. 47 The court therefore considered the conduct of the police pro-
per because the police did not pressure the defendant into confessing." The
court concluded that absent some showing of improper police conduct pressur-
ing the defendant into confessing, the facts in Vance did not support a fin-
ding of involuntariness."
The dissent, like the majority, examined the circumstances surrounding
the confession but concluded that the facts of the case supported a finding
that the defendant involuntarily confessed.5" The dissent stated that courts
must consider two factors when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession
under the fourteenth amendment.' The first factor is the external circumstances
41. 692 F.2d at 980-81. In concluding that mental deficiency is not determinative on the
voluntariness issue, the Vance court cited United States v. Young in which the Fourth Circuit
held that low intelligence is not determinative on the voluntariness issue. 529 F.2d 193, 195 (4th
Cir. 1975).
42. 692 F.2d at 981-82.
43. Id. at 980-82.
44. Id.; see infra notes 118-133 and accompanying text (discussion of court's emphasis on
police conduct when determining voluntariness).
45. 692 F.2d at 981. In Vance, the Fourth Circuit stated that the police conduct was proper
since the police did not pressure the defendant into confessing. Id. According to the majority,
one fact supporting a finding that the police conduct was proper was that the police gave the
defendant several sandwiches and soft drinks. Id at 979. Another factor supporting the propriety
of the police conduct was the police warning to the defendant that the investigation was serious
and that the defendant should not admit involvement in the murders unless he actually was in-
volved. Id. at 981.
46. Id. at 981. The Fourth Circuit in Vance stated that the intermittent questioning by
the police tended to indicate that the police conduct was not coercive. Id. The police intermittently
questioned the defendant from 5:00 p.m. to approximately 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
Id. at 979. Although the Vance court stated that the questioning was intermittent, the court never
expressly specified the length of each particular session or the length of the breaks between each




50. Id. at 982-85 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 982-83 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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surrounding the confession.2 External circumstances are the outside events
such as the police conduct that occurred before and during the confession."
The dissent stated that police conduct is important when considering the ex-
ternal circumstances because courts must determine whether the police coerced
a defendant into confessing involuntarily. 4 After examining the police con-
duct, the dissent agreed with the majority that the police conduct alone did
not prove that the defendant's confession was involuntary." The dissent stated
however that a court must also examine the "internal circumstances" of the
confession.5 6 Internal circumstances include the age and mental capacity of
the confessor." The dissent argued that even while under minimal pressure,
a defendant must possess the capacity to comprehend and waive his constitu-
tional rights in order to voluntarily confess.5 The dissent stated that the men-
tal deficiency and age of the defendant supported a finding that the confes-
sion was involuntary.
59
After the dissent discussed the internal and external factors, the dissent
stated that a court must view the two factors together to ascertain whether
a defendant confessed voluntarily.6" The dissent explained that the police
pressure during interrogation must be considered in combination with the men-
tal capacity of the defendant to resist the police pressure.6 1 The dissent con-
tended that the majority did not examine the two factors in combination, but
52. Id. (Ervin, J., dissenting). In Vance, the dissent did not expressly refer to the factors
surrounding the defendant's confession, such as the police conduct during interrogation, as exter-
nal facts. See id. In Culombe v. Connecticut, however, the Supreme Court specifically termed
such factors as "external factors." 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961); see infra notes 92-96 (discussing
Culombe Court's method of applying totality of the circumstances test); infra notes 106-109 (discuss-
ing how external factors affect voluntariness of confessions); see also Duke, The Internal Strug-
gle Over the Voluntariness Concept, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1983, at 21. One commentator states
that the external component of the voluntariness determination is whether an outside force, such
as the police, impaired the freedom of the defendant in choosing a course of action. Id.
53. See supra note 52 (definition of external circumstances).
54. 692 F.2d at 982 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Ervin, J., dissenting).
56. 692 F.2d at 982-85 (Ervin, J., dissenting). In Vance, the dissent did not expressly refer
to the defendant's mental capacity to make a voluntary confession as an internal circumstance.
Id. The dissent in Vance discussed the defendant's mental capacity to voluntarily confess and
other facts that the Culombe Court termed "internal factors." 692 F.2d at 983-84; Culombe,
367 U.S. at 603. See infra notes 95-99 (discussion of affect of internal factors on voluntariness
of confession); see also Duke, supra note 52, at 21 (internal component of voluntariness deter-
nuination is whether accused understood nature and consequences of any statements made to police).
57. 692 F.2d at 982-83; see infra notes 76-92 & 102-105 (discussing how age and mental
capacity affect voluntariness determination).
58. 692 F.2d at 982-83 (Ervin, J., dissenting); see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text (discussing inental capacity required to confess voluntarily).
59. 692 F.2d at 982-83 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 983 (Ervin, J., dissenting); see infra notes 99, 112-116 and accompanying text
(proper application of totality of the circumstances test demands that courts examine interaction
of internal and external circumstances of confession when determining voluntariness).
61. 692 F.2d at 983 (Ervin, J., dissenting); see infra notes 87-89, 94 and text accompanying
notes 104-106 (defining mental capacity to mean extent of individual's understanding of nature
and consequences of his actions).
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rather erroneously examined the two factors separately in making the volun-
tariness determination.6 2 The dissent noted that the majority failed to discuss
any cases that addressed the effect of the combination of youth and mental
deficiency on the voluntariness of confession.6 3 The dissent stated that the
majority's failure to examine a case involving the combined effect of youth
and mental deficiency on the voluntariness of a confession was important since
the Vance case involved a mentally deficient juvenile."" The dissent argued
that the majority failed to place enough importance on the interaction be-
tween the defendant's mental deficiency 65 and the police conduct during the
interrogation in ruling the defendant's confession voluntary. 6 The dissent con-
cluded that the majority was incorrect in ruling the defendant's confession
voluntary because the majority failed to consider the interaction of all the
factors surrounding the confession.
6 7
After criticizing the majority's analysis, the dissent considered the effect
of the combination of internal and external circumstances surrounding the
defendant's confession on the voluntariness of the confession.6 8 The dissent
considered the fact that the defendant did not have the assistance of counsel
or an adult present during the interrogation as important because without the
assistance of counsel or support of an adult, the defendant was especially
vulnerable to police pressure due to his youth and mental deficiency.6 9 While
the majority considered the length of the interrogation as noncoercive, the
dissent considered the extended length of the interrogation as a factor support-
ing an involuntariness finding." The dissent stated that the defendant's con-
fession was the result of the defendant's succumbing to the encouragements
of the police.7 ' The dissent concluded that the combination of the internal
circumstances such as the defendant's mental deficiency, and the external cir-
cumstances, such as the police conduct, rendered the defendant's confession
involuntary."
While the dissent and the majority in Vance did not agree on the issue
62. 692 F.2d at 983 (Ervin, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 114-117 (ex-
amination of majority's method for determining voluntariness of defendant's confession).
63. 692 F.2d at 983-84 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 984.
66. Id. at 984-85.
67. Id. at 983-86 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 985 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Ervin, J., dissenting); see infra note 83 and accompanying text (important factor
in determining voluntariness of juvenile confession is whether juvenile had adult assistance during
interrogation).
70. 692 F.2d at 985 (Ervin, J., dissenting). The dissent in Vance considered the length of
the interrogation as coercive, and viewed the intermittent interrogation of the defendant until
late at night as a factor tending to make the defendant's confession involuntary. Id. The majority,
however, did not emphasize the fact that the interrogation lasted until 2:00 a.m. See id. at 981.
Instead, the majority emphasized the fact that the interrogation was intermittent in determining
that the questioning was acceptable. Id.
71. Id. at 986 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 984-86 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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of whether the confession was voluntary, the majority and dissent both cor-
rectly agreed that a court considering the voluntariness of a confession must
examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession." The
Supreme Court has established the totality of the circumstances test as the
test courts should use when determining the voluntariness of confessions.1
4
The Supreme Court has specifically stated that courts should apply the totality
test when examining confessions by mentally deficient juveniles."
Two important factors when applying the totality of the circumstances
test to the Vance case were the age and mental deficiency of the defendant.7
The Supreme Court addressed the age factor in Fare v. Michael C.77 and re-
jected the argument that juvenile confessions were per se inadmissible."8 In-
stead, the Fare court held that age was only one factor in the totality of the
circumstances test that courts must consider when making the voluntariness
determination." Although age alone is not determinative on the voluntariness
issue, the Supreme Court in United States v. Haley" expressly stated that courts
must view juvenile confessions with special scrutiny.81 The Haley court stated
that juvenile confessions demand special scrutiny because juveniles are not
as mature as adults and therefore, juveniles are more susceptible to police
pressure.2 Both the Supreme Court and circuit courts have stated that due
73. See id. at 980-82; supra note 6 (courts determine voluntariness by examining totality
of circumstances surrounding confession).
74. See Blackburn v. Alabama 361 U.S. 199, 201 (1960). In Blackburn, the Supreme Court
determined whether the confession of a mentally ill defendant was voluntary. Id. at 202-05. The
Blackburn Court held that the totality of the circumstances test applies to confessions of mentally
deficient individuals. Id. at 207; see infra note 85 (discussion of Blackburn v. Alabama); see
also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). In Fare, the Supreme Court held that the
totality of the circumstances test was the proper test to discern whether a juvenile had validly
waived his Miranda rights prior to police interrogation. Id. at 725-26. Although Fare involved
the waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogation,
rather than the determination of the voluntariness of a confession, the Fare court noted in dictum
that the totality test applies to a variety of constitutional rights including the voluntariness of
confessions. Id. at 726.
75. See infra notes 77-82 (Supreme Court in Fare and Haley stated that courts must deter-
mine voluntariness of juvenile confessions by examining totality of circumstances surrounding
confession); infra notes 85-88 (Supreme Court in Blackburn and Fikes stated that courts must
determine voluntariness of confession by mentally deficient person by examining totality of
circumstances).
76. 692 F.2d at 980.
77. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
78. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979); see Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d 1158,
1159 (4th Cir. 1978). In Miller, the Fourth Circuit held that age alone does not render a confes-
sion inadmissible. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a "streetwise" juvenile experienced with
police procedures could confess voluntarily. Id.
79. Fare, 442 U.S. at 726.
80. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
81. Id. at 599.
82. Id. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962). In Gallegos, the Supreme Court
agreed with a 14 year old boy's assertion that his confession was involuntary. Id. at 55. In finding
the confession involuntary, the court emphasized the age of the defendant, the fact that the length
of confinement was five days, and the fact that the police did not allow defendant's parents
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
to a juvenile's immaturity, an important factor when considering the volun-
tariness of juvenile confessions is whether the juvenile had the benefit of the
advice of parents or a responsible adult during the interrogation. 3 While the
dissent in Vance considered the fact that the defendant did not have the
assistance of an adult during the interrogation as part of the totality of the
circumstances test,"4 the majority did not address this fact directly when analyz-
ing the defendant's confession." The majority's failure to discuss the effect
that the absence of adult guidance had on the defendant's confession sup-
ports the dissent's assertion that the majority was wrong in holding that the
defendant voluntarily confessed because this failure demonstrates that the
majority did not actually use the totality test.
8 6
In addition to considering the defendant's age, courts must consider
whether the defendant is mentally deficient when applying the totality of the
circumstances test." The Supreme Court in Fikes v. Alabama88 stated that
to see him during the confinement. Id at 54. The court noted that juveniles are highly susceptible
to police pressure since juveniles are not as mature as adults and do not have the same understan-
ding and knowledge of the consequences of police interrogation. Id.
83. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55 (lack of adult guidance is key factor in finding juvenile
confession involuntary); Moore v. Ballone, 658 F.2d 218, 229 (4th Cir. 1981) (court considered
police denial of defendant's request to see his mother as factor in determining that juvenile con-
fession was involuntary); See also Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d. 929, 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1980). In Jurek, a young defendant confessed to the murder of a ten year old
girl. Id at 934. The defendant had been in custody for 42 hours prior to confessing to the murder.
Id. at 935. During the confinement, the police refused to allow either the defendant's parents
or lawyers to see the defendant. Id. The Fifth Circuit weighed the police pressure against the
defendant's capacity to resist such pressure and concluded that the confession was involuntary.
Id. at 937. See Makarewicz v. Scafati, 438 F.2d 474, 479 (1st Cir.) (confession held voluntary
partially because father of defendant was allowed by police to assist defendant during interroga-
tion), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 980 (1971); Michaud v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 971, 974 (1st Cir. 1970)
(fact that police did not deny defendant's parents access was one factor in finding confession
voluntary); Ledbetter v. Warden, 368 F.2d 490, 492 (4th Cir. 1966) (one factor court considered
in finding confession involuntary was police denial of defendant's requests to see friends and
family), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967). See generally Seman, A Juvenile's Waiver of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination-A Federal and State Comparison, 10 Aii. J. CRai. L. 27, 40 (1982)
(absence of parents or guardian during juvenile interrogation creates presumption of incapacity
of waiver).
84. 692 F.2d at 985 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 980-82. The majority in Vance noted that the defendant's mother chose not to
accompany him to the jail. Id. at 979. The majority, however, did not discuss the effect that
the lack of adult guidance during the interrogation could have on the voluntariness of the defen-
dant's confession. Id. at 980-83.
86. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (lack of adult guidance during interroga-
tion supports finding of involuntariness).
87. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). In Blackburn, the defendant
confessed to armed robbery. Id. at 200. Prior to trial, psychiatrists diagnosed the defendant as
being permanently mentally disabled. Id. The trial court conducted a hearing on the voluntariness
of the confession and decided that the confession was voluntary. Id. at 202. The Supreme Court
emphasized the fact that the defendant was mentally deficient and the fact that the police ques-
tioned the defendant for approximately nine hours in concluding that the defendant's confession
was involuntary. Id at 207-08; see United States v. Young, 529 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1975)
(court held that mental deficiency is one factor to consider in determining voluntariness).
88. 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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the fact that a defendant is mentally deficient is an important, but not deter-
minative factor to consider when making a voluntariness determination.89 The
Fikes Court stated that a mentally deficient person is overly susceptible to
police pressure during interrogation, 9 and may not have the intelligence or
mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of his actions when
confessing.9 The Supreme Court discussed mental capacity in Fare v. Michael
C., and explained that the mental capacity of the confessor is important to
the voluntariness determination since a person must have sufficient intelligence
to comprehend what occurs during interrogation before he can voluntarily
confess. 92
While the majority in Vance was correct in noting that age and mental
deficiency are not determinative of the voluntariness issue, 93 the majority did
89. Id. at 197. In Fikes, the Supreme Court considered the voluntariness of an uneducated,
mentally deficient defendant's confessions. Id. at 196-97. The police had elicited the confessions
from the defendant after two days of questioning. Id. at 197. The Supreme Court held that the
confessions were involuntary, noting that the defendant's mental deficiency was an important
factor to consider when making a voluntariness determination. Id. at 196-97.
90. Id. at 193, 197-98. In determining the voluntariness of the defendant's confession, the
Fikes Court noted that testimony of psychiatrists indicated that the defendant was highly suscep-
tible to police pressure. Id. at 193.
91. Id at 196-98. See, e.g., May v. Leneair, 99 Mich. App. 209, 212, 297 N.W.2d 882,
884 (1980) (mentally deficient person lacks sufficient capacity to understand effect of act he is
performing); Haile v. Holtzclaw, 400 S.W.2d 603, 612-13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (in order to
voluntarily commit an act, person must posses sufficient mental capacity to understand nature
and consequences of act), rev'd on other grounds, 414 S.W.2d 916 (1967), Leick v. Pozniak,
135 N.J. Eq. 67, 69, 37 A.2d 302, 303 (1944) (person's actions are valid and voluntary if he
possessed sufficient mental ability to understand effect of his act when he performed act); see
also infra notes 92, 102-103 and accompanying text (mentally deficient juveniles do not have
sufficient mental capacity to comprehend consequences of confession).
92. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979). The Supreme Court in Fare noted that
a person must have sufficient intelligence to comprehend what the possible effects and conse-
quences of interrogation are before he can waive his constitutional rights and make a meaningful
confession. Id.; see United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 133 (9th Cir. 1981) (confession is not
voluntary when given by person whose mental condition was such that confessor did not under-
stand consequences of what he was doing when he confessed); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d
1120, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1973) (court defined mentally deficient person as person with obvious
subnormal intelligence). See generally Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful
Analysis, 55 Tx. L. REv. 193, 260 (1977). Professor Dix argues that a person must possess
the mental capacity to make rational choices to effectively waive a particular constitutional right.
Id. at 260. Dix argues that courts should require that a defendant understand the factual and
legal consequences of what he is going before the defendant can voluntarily waive a particular
constitutional right. Id. at 264. Professor Dix notes that a defendant must also have the mental
capacity to resist improper police attempts to influence the defendant's decision to make a state-
ment. Id. at 265.
93. 692 F.2d at 981-82. Numerous cases support the proposition that diminished mental
capacity is not determinative of the issue of voluntariness. See, e.g., Coney v. Wyrick, 532 F.2d
94, 97-98 (8th Cir. 1976) (subnormal intelligence is not determinative of voluntariness issue); Gibbs
v. Warden, 450 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (subnormal mentality indicates, but does
not establish, that confession was involuntary), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979). Numerous
cases also support the proposition that age alone is not determinative on the issue of voluntariness.
See, e.g., Mossbrook v. United States, 409 F.2d 503, 504 (9th Cir. 1969) (age alone does not
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not adequately consider age and mental deficiency under the circumstances
test.94 The United States Supreme Court in Culombe v. Connecticut95 stated
that a court must examine three parts of a confession to properly apply the
totality of the circumstances test.96 According to the Culombe Court, a court
first must examine the mental capacity of the person confessing.97 Second,
a court must examine the external factors, such as the police conduct surround-
ing the confession. 98 Third, a court must consider the effect of the combina-
tion of the internal and external factors in determining whether the confession
was voluntary.9
The Vance dissent properly applied the three part Culombe test.' The
Vance dissent agreed with the Culombe decision that a court must first examine
whether a particular defendant has the requisite mental capacity to comprehend
what occurred during an interrogation before the court examines the external
factors such as the police conduct.'' Empirical studies suggest that mentally
deficient juveniles are not capable of comprehending what is happening dur-
render confession inadmissible); Williams v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 528, 530 (4th Cir. 1968) (court
rejected contention that juvenile confession is per se involuntary); United States v. Lovejoy, 364
F.2d 586, 589 (2d Cir. 1966) (age alone does not render confession inadmissible), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 974 (1967).
94. See infra notes 95-121 and accompanying text (Vance majority improperly applied totality
of circumstances test).
95. 367 U.S. 568 (1961). In Culombe, a mentally deficient defendant confessed to a murder
that was one of a series of murders terrifying local operators of small businesses. Id. at 569.
Tremendous public pressure existed to solve the murders and apprehend the people responsible.
See id. at 569-72. The police arrested the defendant and interrogated him for ten straight days
obtaining five separate confessions from the defendant. Id at 570. The police never informed
the defendant of his constitutional rights and denied the defendant the benefit of counsel during
the interrogation. Id. After examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confes-
sion, the Supreme Court held that the confession was involuntary because of the extended length
of the interrogation and the absence of counsel during interrogation. Id. at 635.
96. See id. at 603 (Culombe Court's three-part method for applying totality of circumstances
test).
97. Id. The Supreme Court in Culombe defined the subjective mental capacity of the defen-
dant as an internal psychological fact. Id.; see infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (discussing
first part of Culombe test which examines internal circumstances of confession).
98. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603. The Culombe Court noted that ascertaining external facts
surrounding the confession is the function of the original trial court. Id. at 603-04; see infra
notes 107-109 and accompanying text (discussing second part of Culombe test which examines
external circumstances surrounding confession).
99. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603-604. The Culombe Court explained that the third stage of
the totality of the circumstances test involves the courts evaluation of the accused's reaction to
the external conduct of the police. Id. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (discussing
third stage of Culombe test).
100. See infra notes 101-117 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Vance dissent prop-
erly applied Culombe test when determining voluntariness of defendant's confession).
101. 692 F.2d at 983 (Ervin, J., dissenting). In Vance, the dissent argued that courts must
consider the defendant's mental capacity together with the police conduct during interrogation
to determine whether the defendant's confession was voluntary. Id.; see Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 185 (1953) (courts must balance amount of police pressure on defendant to confess
in relation to defendant's mental capacity for resisting pressure when determining voluntariness
of confession). - _
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ing interrogation proceedings.' °0 These studies demonstrate that since a men-
tally deficient juvenile is incapable of comprehending what occurs during police
interrogation, the mentally deficient juvenile is incapable of confessing
voluntarily.' 3 Therefore, perfect police conduct during the interrogation of
a juvenile incapable of voluntarily confessing does not make that defendant's
confession voluntary."0 4 The majority in Vance, however, never examined
whether the defendant had the mental capacity to comprehend what was going
on during the interrogation, and thus failed to consider whether the defen-
dant had the capacity to voluntarily confess.' 3 The Vance court's failure to
examine the defendant's capacity to confess demonstrates that the majority
did not satisfy the first stage of the Culombe test, and thus did not apply
the totality of the circumstances test properly.' 6
102. See Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REv. 1134, 1152 (1980). Grisso, an Associate Professor of Psychology at St. Louis
University, conducted empirical studies to determine whether juvenile defendants between the
ages of 10 and 16 understand the constitutional rights that police give at the time of arrest. Id.
at 1144. Specifically, Grisso examined the juvenile defendant's understanding of the right to re-
main silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogation. Id. Grisso concluded that
juveniles between the ages of 10 and 16, in general, do not understand the nature and significance
of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogation. Id. at
1166. Grisso further noted that juveniles with intelligence quotients ("IQ's") below 80 had a
lower comprehension of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during
interrogation than juveniles with normal IQ's. Id. at 1160. Grisso concluded that juveniles with
IQ's below 80 are incapable of voluntarily waiving the right to remain silent and the right to
have counsel present during interrogation. Id. at 1166; see also Seman, supra note 81, at 42 (empirical
studies suggest juveniles do not possess sufficient mental development to understand or waive
their constitutional rights).
In Vance, the police informed the defendant of the right to remain silent and the right to
have counsel present during interrogation. 692 F.2d at 979. The Fourth Circuit assumed that
the defendant understood his rights and therefore voluntarily waived his rights when he spoke
to the police without the assistance of counsel concerning the murder. Id. at 981. The results
of Grisso's studies, however, indicate that the defendant in Vance would be incapable of understand-
ing the right to remain silent and to have counsel present because the defendant's IQ was subnor-
mal. See Grisso, supra at 1166. Since the defendant in Vance could not understand his constitu-
tional rights, he could not have waived those rights voluntarily. See id. The defendant in Vance,
therefore, could not have confessed voluntarily because the principles underlying a voluntary
waiver of the constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel and
a voluntary confession are similar. The underlying principles are similar because a person must
have the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of either relinquishing constitutional
rights or confessing. See infra note 135 (rationale underlying voluntary waiver is similar to ra-
tionale underlying voluntary confession because in each instance person must have mental capaci-
ty to comprehend consequences of his actions).
103. See supra note 102 (empirical studies indicate that mentally deficient juveniles cannot
voluntarily confess).
104. See supra note 102 (empirical studies indicate that mentally deficient juveniles cannot
confess voluntarily).
105. 692 F.2d at 980-82. Instead of examining whether the defendant had the capacity to
voluntarily confess, the majority in Vance only noted that neither the defendant's age nor his
mental deficiency alone rendered his confession involuntary. Id.
106. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (Culombe method for applying totality
test dictates that courts must examine mental capacity of defendant in determining voluntariness).
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While the first stage of the Culombe test requires courts to examine inter-
nal factors such as mental capacity, the second stage requires a court to ex-
amine the external factors such as police conduct surrounding the confession.
The length and severity of the police interrogation is an important external
factor under the totality of the circumstances test for determining the volun-
tariness of confessions.0 8 Length and severity of interrogations are particularly
important factors in judging police conduct0 9 because the likelihood that a
person will involuntarily succumb to police questioning increases as the length
and severity of the questioning increases. " ' In Vance, the majority did make
an extensive examination of the police conduct when evaluating the volun-
tariness of the defendant's confession, and thereby satisfied the second stage
of the Culombe test."'
The third stage of the Culombe test requires courts to consider the inter-
relationship between external factors, such as police conduct, and internal fac-
tors, such as mental capacity, when determining whether a defendant's con-
107. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603.
108. See id. at 605; supra note 105 (second part of Culombe test requires examination of
external circumstances including police conduct); infra notes 109-110 (police conduct is important
when determining voluntariness of confession); infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text (Vance
majority overemphasized police conduct); see also Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 21, 23 (1965). Sutherland states that courts frequently emphasize police conduct during
interrogation because such police conduct is often the most influential factor in causing a defen-
dant to confess. Id. at 23. Sutherland argues that police conduct is influential because police
try to elicit confessions from people suspected of crimes even when the evidence against that
person is weak because of the community pressure on police to prevent and solve crimes. Id.
at 22-23. Sutherland notes that highly developed police techniques designed to extract confessions
are very effective in getting a particular defendant to confess. Id. Sutherland's arguments that
police interrogation techniques can be coercive and result in unreliable confessions therefore sug-
gest that courts should examine police conduct during interrogation carefully.
109. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1956) (oppressive length of interroga-
tion was key factor influencing court's finding of involuntariness); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
599 (1948) (extended duration of police questioning was important factor influencing court's decision
that defendant's confession was involuntary); Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 935 (5th Cir.) (court
considered extended length of police questioning as important factor in finding confession in-
voluntary), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1980); Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 369 F.2d 584, 589 (5th
Cir. 1966) (court primarily emphasized excessive length of questioning in holding that confession
was involuntary). Courts have also viewed a short period of questioning as a factor supporting
a finding of voluntariness. See, e.g., United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir.
1982) (fact that police only questioned defendant 29 minutes was important factor influencing
court's finding of voluntariness); Iverson v. North Dakota, 480 F.2d 414, 425 (8th Cir.) (court
noted that brief interrogation indicated that police did not coerce defendant into confessing),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044 (1973); Michaud v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 971, 974 (1st Cir. 1970) (im-
portant factor in voluntariness determination was nonextensive questioning of defendant).
110. See United States exrel. Adams v. Bensinger, 507 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 1974) (extended
period of interrogation pressured defendant into confessing), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975);
United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1971) (court concluded confession was involun-
tary since lengthy police interrogation pressured defendant into confessing).
111. 692 F.2d at 981-82; see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (aspects of police
conduct Vance majority considered when analyzing voluntariness of defendant's confession); supra
notes 50-55 (dissent's discussion of propriety of police conduct).
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fession was voluntary. ' 2 The dissent in Vance correctly considered the inter-
action of the defendant's mental capacity with the police conduct during the
defendant's interrogation in evaluating the voluntariness of the confession. "13
Conversely, the majority did not actually examine the effect that all of the
circumstances surrounding the confession had on the voluntariness of the
confession.'" The majority first examined the defendant's youth and mental
deficiency," 5 and then separately examined the police conduct without taking
into account the defendant's mental capacity to withstand any police pressure. "6
Thus, the majority failed to properly apply the totality test since they neglected
to consider the third part of the Culombe test." 7
In failing to apply the totality of the circumstances test properly, the Vance
majority overemphasized the external factors surrounding the defendant's
confession, ' 8 and made only a cursory examination of the defendant's men-
tal deficiency and youth."' The majority mentioned and noted the effect that
youth and mental deficiency can have on a confession, but disregarded this
effect in the final determination of voluntariness and instead emphasized the
police conduct. 120 Although the majority stated that they were applying the
totality of the circumstances test, the majority in reality did not apply the
112. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603-605; see Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957).
The Fikes Court suggested a method of determining the voluntariness of confessions by mentally
deficient people in which the amount of allowable police pressure during interrogation depends
on the subjective mental capacity of the defendant to resist the pressure. Id. at 197-98. The Fikes
method suggests that as the mental capacity of confessor decreases, the amount of police pressure
that courts could allow and still find the confession voluntary would decrease. See also Stein
v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953) (courts must consider amount of police pressure placed
on defendant to confess in relation to defendant's mental capacity for resisting pressure when
determining voluntariness of confession).
113. See 692 F.2d at 983-85 (Ervin, J., dissenting); supra notes 58-61, 71-72 and accompany-
ing text (conclusion of Vance dissent that combination of police conduct, mental deficiency, and
age of defendant rendered confession involuntary).
114. 692 F.2d at 980-82. The dissent in Vance charged the majority with using a piecemeal
approach that resulted in a separate examination of the internal and external factors of the con-
fession instead of a combination approach that required examination of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. Id. at 983 (Ervin, J., dissenting); see infra
notes 115-116 and accompanying text (description of approach Vance majority used in examining
totality of circumstances surrounding defendant's confession).
115. 692 F.2d at 980-81; see supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (majority's discussion
that age and mental deficiency are factors in totality test).
116. 692 F.2d at 981-82; see supra note 112 and accompanying text (courts should consider
defendant's mental capacity in relation to police pressure during interrogation when determining
voluntariness).
117. See supra notes 112-116 (Culombe holds that courts should examine interaction of in-
ternal and external factors in confession situation). By failing to consider the defendant's mental
deficiency when determining the amount of police pressure that the defendant in Vance could
withstand, the majority did not apply the third part of Culombe's totality of the circumstances test.
118. See 692 F.2d at 981-82; see infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's emphasis on police conduct when evaluating voluntariness of confessions).
119. See 692 F.2d at 980-81.
120. Id; see infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit emphasized pro-
priety of police conduct in voluntariness determination).
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totality test because the court failed to consider the combined effect of the
defendant's mental deficiency and the police conduct on the voluntariness of
the defendant's confession.' The Vance court's emphasis on police conduct
is consistent with previous Fourth Circuit decisions on the voluntariness issue. 22
In Thomas v. North Carolina,'2 3 the Fourth Circuit also emphasized the police
conduct in determining the voluntariness of a confession.'24 Although the
factual situations in Thomas and Vance were remarkably similar,I25 the Fourth
Circuit reached different results concerning the voluntariness of the confes-
sions in the two cases. 26 The only significant factual difference between Vance
and Thomas was the propriety of the policy conduct.'27 In both Thomas and
Vance, therefore, the Fourth Circuit's decision on whether the confession was
voluntary depended on the characterization of whether the police conduct was
proper.'28
121. See 692 F.2d at 980-82; see supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text (Vance majori-
ty overemphasized propriety of police conduct).
122. See infra notes 123-128 (example of Fourth Circuit's emphasis on police conduct); see
also Williams v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 528, 530 (4th Cir. 1968). Williams was factually similar to
Vance because the defendant in Williams, like the defendant in Vance, was 15 years old when
he confessed. Id. at 531; 692 F.2d at 981. In Williams, the defendant asserted in his habeas cor-
pus petition that the trial court had improperly admitted his pretrial confession. 404 F.2d at
530. The defendant contended that the confession was per se involuntary since the defendant
was onely 15 years old when he confessed. See id. Although the Fourth Circuit rejected the defen-
dant's per se argument, the Fourth Circuit determined that the defendant's confession was in-
voluntary due to the impropriety of the police conduct. Id. at 530-31. The court found that the
police conduct was improper because the police held the defendant incommunicado for three
days and did not inform the defendant of either the right to counsel or the right to remain silent
before the defendant confessed. Id. Thus, the police conduct was an important factor in the
Williams court's determination that the defendant's confession was involuntary. Id.
123. 447 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1971).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1320-22; 692 F.2d at 980-81. In both Vance and Thomas, the defendant was
a 15 year old mental deficient who confessed to murder. 692 F.2d at 980; 447 F.2d at 1321-22.
In both Vance and Thomas, the trial court admitted the defendant's confession over the defen-
dant's objection that the confession was involuntary. 692 F.2d at 980; 447 F.2d at 1321.
126. Compare Vance, 692 F.2d at 981-82 (propriety of police conduct rendered defendant's
confession voluntary); with Thomas, 447 F.2d at 1321-22 (improper police conduct rendered defen-
dant's confession involuntary); see also infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text (courts' dif-
fering characterization of police conduct in Vance and Thomas resulted in differing determina-
tions of voluntariness of confessions).
127. See Thomas, 447 F.2d at 1321-22; 692 F.2d at 980-82. In Thomas, a key factor in
finding the police conduct improper was the police questioning of the defendant for four con-
tinuous hours late at night, and again for nine hours the following day. 447 F.2d at 1321. The
police questioned the defendant continuously from 12:00 a.m. until 4:00 a.m., and from 7:30
a.m. the following morning until 5:00 p.m., when the defendant finally confessed to murder.
Id. Another factor in Thomas supporting the impropriety of the police conduct was the fact
that the police did not inform the defendant of his right to counsel. Id. The police did inform
the defendant of his right to remain silent, but encouraged the defendant to talk by telling the
defendant that talking would be in the defendant's best interest. Id. The Thomas court concluded
that the impropriety of the police conduct was a major cause of the defendant's confession. Id.
at 1321-22.
128. See supra notes 121-127 (Fourth Circuit emphasizes police conduct when determining
voluntariness).
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In addition to the Fourth Circuit, many other circuit courts also over-
emphasize police conduct when making the voluntariness determination.'29 As
in Vance, the other circuits recognize the totality of the circumstances test
as the proper test to determine voluntariness of confessions, but actually fail
to properly apply the test by focusing on the propriety of police conduct and
ignoring whether the defendant has the capacity to voluntarily confess."'3 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit's emphasis on police conduct is consistent with the approach
used by other circuit courts.' 3 ' Although the Vance court's reasoning is con-
sistent with other circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit's emphasis on the propriety
of the police conduct is incorrect in light of the totality of the circumstances
test which dictates that courts should examine all the circumstances surround-
ing a confession.' 32
The Vance decision demonstrates the method the Fourth Circuit will use
in determining the voluntariness of confessions by mentally deficient
juveniles. 33 The key factor the Fourth Circuit will examine in determining
whether a particular confession is voluntary is the police conduct during the
129. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (circuit courts emphasizing police conduct
when determining voluntariness of confessions).
130. See Iverson v. North Dakota, 480 F.2d 414, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044
(1973). In Iverson, the Fifth Circuit stated that the court would examine the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. Id. In reality, however, the Iverson court
overemphasized the police conduct and concluded that the confession was voluntary because the
police did not threaten or restrain the defendant during interrogation. Id. at 424-25. In United
States v. Yeager, the Third Circuit considered the confession of a 16 year old boy. 446 F.2d
1360, 1361 (3rd Cir. 1971). In Yeager, the defendant confessed to murder after two and one-half
hours of police questioning. Id. at 1361. The Yeager court emphasized that the police conduct
was proper since the interrogation was brief and, therefore, the defendant's confession was volun-
tary. Id. at 1362. In Cotton v. United States, the Eighth Circuit considered a case in which a
15 year old boy confessed to stealing a treasury check. 446 F.2d 107, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1971).
The Eighth Circuit found the confession voluntary because the police only questioned the defen-
dant for two hours and used no physical coercion in eliciting the statement. Id. at 109-10. In
Michaud v. Robbins, the First Circuit examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding
a 15 year old defendant's confession. 424 F.2d 971, 973-74 (1st Cir. 1970). The Michaud court
concluded that the confession was voluntary since the police interrogation that elicited the con-
fession was neither intensive nor coercive. Id. at 975. In Kerr v. City of Chicago, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for illegal detainment. 424 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
833 (1970). The police had used the plaintiff's confession to detain him for 18 months without
a trial. Id. at 1138. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the confession used to detain the plaintiff
was involuntary because of improper police conduct, such as promising the plaintiff food and
water if he would confess, during the interrogation. Id. at 1137-38. In United States v. Glover,
a juvenile defendant confessed to passing a forged check. 372 F.2d 43, 44-45 (2nd Cir. 1967).
The Second Circuit examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and
concluded that the confession was involuntary because of improper police conduct in detaining
the defendant for 15 hours. Id. at 46-47.
131. See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit and other circuits em-
phasize police conduct when determining voluntariness of confessions).
132. See supra notes 94-128 and accompanying text (courts that only examine propriety of
police conduct when determining voluntariness do not properly apply totality of the circumstances
test).
133. See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth Circuit's method
of determining voluntariness of confessions).
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interrogation of the defendant.'34 Although the Fourth Circuit may recognize
age as an important factor, the court will accord little weight to the fact that
a particular defendant is a juvenile.'33 While the Fourth Circuit also will
acknowledge that mental deficiency is a factor to consider when determining
voluntariness, mental deficiency probably will not be enough to change the
outcome of a confession case once the Fourth Circuit decides that the police
conduct which led to the confession was proper. ',36 In cases involving the con-
fession of a mentally deficient juvenile, the Fourth Circuit apparently will
characterize a confession elicited by proper police conduct as voluntary and
a confession elicited by improper police conduct as involuntary. Since police
conduct is the key factor the Fourth Circuit examines in determining volun-
tariness, Fourth Circuit practitioners attempting to argue that a confession
was involuntary should argue that the particular police conduct surrounding
the confession was improper. The practitioner should inquire into the behavior
of the police during the interrogation, and argue that police pressure caused
the confession. 37 Attorneys should not expect the Fourth Circuit to overturn
a voluntariness determination despite evidence that the defendant was a men-
tally deficient juvenile unless the police conduct in obtaining the particular
confession was clearly improper. '
134. See supra notes 121-128 (discussion of rationale underlying Fourth Circuit's emphasis
of police conduct when determining the voluntariness of confessions).
135. See supra notes 37-39 & 104-106 and accompanying text (Vance court accorded little
weight to defendant's youth when determining voluntariness of confession); supra notes 121-128
(Fourth Circuit previously has accorded little weight to defendant's youth when determining volun-
tariness of confessions). In United States v. Miller, the Fourth Circuit determined the volun-
tariness of a 14 year old defendant's waiver of Miranda rights and confession. 453 F.2d 634,
635 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972). The Miller court rejected the proposition that
a juvenile is incapable of waiving constitutional rights. Id. at 635-36. Instead, the Fourth Circuit
stated that they would examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, and
held both the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights and the defendant's confession voluntary
because the postal inspector questioning the defendant did not coerce or pressure the defendant
during the interrogation. Id. although the Miller court determined the voluntariness of both a
waiver and a confession, the rationale underlying a voluntary waiver is similar to the rationale
underlying a voluntary confession because in each instance a person must have the mental capacity
to comprehend his rights and the consequences of his actions. See id. at 635-36. The decisions
in Miller, Vance, Williams, and Thomas demonstrate that the Fourth Circuit will accord little
weight to the age of a confessor when determining the voluntariness of a confession. See supra
notes 121-134 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit accords little weight to age when determin-
ing voluntariness of confessions).
136. See supra notes 121-128 (Fourth Circuit emphasizes propriety of police conduct in volun-
tariness determination). The decisions in Vance, Thomas, and Williams demonstrate that the Fourth
Circuit will accord little weight to the mental deficiency of a confessor when determining the
voluntariness of a confession. See supra notes 105-106 & 121-134 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit emphasizes police conduct and accords little weight to mental deficiency of confessor
when determining voluntariness of confession).
137. See supra notes 73-133 and accompanying text (propriety of police conduct is controll-
ing factor in Fourth Circuit's determination of voluntariness).
138. See supra notes 121 & 129-130 and accompanying text (only improper police conduct
will render confession involuntary); supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (fact that mentally
deficient person cannot comprehend consequences of confession renders confession involuntary);
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The Fourth Circuit in Vance v. Bordenkircher examined the confession
of a mentally deficient juvenile and determined that the confession was
voluntary.'39 Although determining the voluntariness of a confession is not
an easy task, the Fourth Circuit in Vance did nothing to make this task easier
for courts in the future.'4 0 While the propriety of police conduct is easier to
ascertain and examine than the mental capacity of the defendant, relying on
the propriety of the police conduct to determine the voluntariness of a confes-
sion is incorrect when a particular defendant is so mentally deficient that he
is extremely susceptible to police pressure.
S. PERRY THoMAs, JR.
C. False Personation: Acts Sufficient to Convict Under
18 U.S.C. Section 912
Section 912 of Title 18 of the United States Code imposes a criminal penalty
on any person who impersonates an officer or employee of the United States.'
Congress enacted section 912 to preserve the prestige and dignity of federal
supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (mentally deficient juveniles are incapable of volun-
tarily confessing).
139. 692 F.2d at 981-82.
140. See Duke, supra note 52, at 21-22 (determining voluntariness of confessions is concept
that most courts have not applied consistently and have not explained clearly).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976). Section 912 of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits
the impersonation of an officer or employee of the United States and imposes a fine of up to
$1000 or imprisonment for a maximum of three years, or both. Id. The false personation statute
contains two separate offenses. See id. Although § 912 does not set forth distinctively the two
separate offenses, courts traditionally have used bracketed numbers to identify the two offenses
contained within § 912. See United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 654 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(following custom of previous courts by separating false personation offenses by use of bracketed
numbers); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 800 n.1 (5th Cir. 1965) (same). A violation
of § 912[1] occurs when an impersonator asserts the false pretense of federal authority and "acts
as such". 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976). An impersonator violates § 91212] when the impersonator
pretends to be an agent of the United States and thereby demands or obtains an object of value.
Id. Congress first enacted the false personation statute in 1884. See Act of April 18, 1884, ch.
26, 23 Stat. 11 (1884) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976)). The adoption of a uniform
penal code in 1909 produced a minor rewording of the statute that clarified and condensed but
did not change the substance of the existing false personation statute. See Act of March 4, 1909,
ch. 321, § 32, 35 Stat. 1088, 1095 (1909) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976)). Another
revision in 1938 added that courts could convict an impersonator for pretending to be an employee
of a corporation that the United States owned or controlled. See Act of February 28, 1938, ch.
37, 52 Stat. 82 (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976)). The present false personation
statute is the result of a 1948 revision of the Federal Criminal Code that consolidated former
§ 76 and § 123 into present § 912. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 742 (1948)). Former § 76 of the Federal Criminal Code
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office and to promote a spirit of respect for the government. 2 The false per-
sonation statute contains two distinct criminal offenses. 3 Courts traditionally
have inserted bracketed numbers to identify the two offenses under section
912 since the false personation statute does not separate the crimes explicitly.'
The first offense, defined in section 91211] and containing two separate
elements, provides that any individual who first misrepresents himself as an
agent of the United States and second "acts as such" is subject to criminal
prosecution in federal court.' Under the second offense, defined in section
91212], an impersonator is subject to federal conviction for either demanding
or obtaining an object of value while masquerading as a government agent.
6
In United States v. Parker,7 the Fourth Circuit considered what constitutes
an act sufficient to sustain a conviction pursuant to a section 912[l] indict-
ment despite the defendant's apparent absence of fraudulent intent.'
In Parker, the defendant visited the home of Gerald Brooks to purchase
firewood.9 Parker and Brooks made an agreement for the sale and delivery
of a half cord of wood.10 In the course of conversation, Parker falsely in-
formed Brooks for no apparent reason that Parker represented the Internal
contained the general prohibition against impersonating officers or employees of the federal govern-
ment. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976) (Historical Note). Former § 123 of the Federal Criminal Code
forbade the impersonation of a federal revenue officer and imposed a fine of $500 and a punish-
ment of up to two years. Id. Present § 912 merely included revenue officers within the entire
protected class of federal employees. See id. The only major change arising from the 1948 revi-
sion of the false personation statute was the deletion of the phrase "with intent to defraud the
United States or any person." Id. Without explanation, the revisers of the Federal Criminal Code
omitted the "intent to defraud" phrase as meaningless in light of the Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Lepowitch. Id.; see United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943);
infra text accompanying notes 44-49 (discussion of Lepowitch). The Lepowitch Court stated that
"intent to defraud" occurs when an impersonator seeks to change the course of conduct of another.
318 U.S. at 704. Congressional reports on the proposed revisions of the Federal Criminal Code
stated that the revisions only consolidated and simplified the criminal code and preserved the
original intent of Congress. See S. RP. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as S. REp. No. 1620]; H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as H.R. REp. No. 3041.
2. See United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 80 (1915) (discussing policy considerations
behind false personation statute); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir. 1967)
(injury to government occurs by impersonation without fraudulent intent), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
927 (1968); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 802 (5th Cir. 1965) (statute protects impor-
tance of federal office). -
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976).
4. See supra note 1 (explaining courts' usage of bracketed numbers to identify two separate
offenses in § 912).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976).
6. Id.
7. 699 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 122 (1983).
8. Id. at 180. In United States v. Parker, the Fourth Circuit also examined the admissibili-
ty of evidence of other crimes to demonstrate Parker's knowledge of the crime, intent, and iden-
tity in addition to determining whether Parker violated the false personation statute. Id.; see
infra note 34 (discussing admissibility of evidence of other crimes to aid in convicting Parker).
9. 699 F.2d at 177.
10. Id. at 178.
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Revenue Service (IRS)." Parker stated that he was investigating a report that
Brooks failed to pay taxes on income derived from the sale of firewood.1
2
Brooks later contacted the local IRS office to confirm Parker's identity.'3 An
IRS agent conducted an investigation in which the agent, posing as Brooks,
telephoned Parker at home.' Parker reasserted his government affiliation to
the IRS agent but stated that the IRS had terminated the investigation of
'Brooks. I The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
convicted Parker under section 912[1] and sentenced him to three years im-
prisonment with all but three months of Parker's sentence suspended.' 6
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Parker conceded that the district court
prosecution had established the first element of a section 9121l] violation by
demonstrating that Parker falsely pretended to have been an IRS agent.' 7 The
defendant, however, claimed that the prosecution in the district court pro-
ceeding never sufficiently established the second element of section 912[1] that
Parker acted as a federal agent.' 8 Parker argued that he made his misrepresen-
tations to Brooks as part of an innocent masquerade and that Parker's actions
did not violate the statute forbidding the impersonation of federal officers.19
In presenting a defense, Parker relied solely upon United States v. Rosser."0
In Rosser, the defendant misrepresented himself as an IRS agent to a gas station
owner during the gasoline crisis of 1974. 2' For eleven days Rosser controlled
the entire operation of the gas station, including the system of gasoline
allocation.2 2 Upon considering the facts of Rosser, the District of Columbia
11. Id.
12. Id. In Parker, the defendant did not use his pretended authority as an Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) agent to obtain a lower price for firewood since the price which Parker agreed
to pay was Brooks' regular price. Id. Parker therefore did not violate § 91212] since Parker did
not demand or obtain an object of value. Id.; see supra note 1 (no violation of § 912[2] if imper-
sonator did not attempt to obtain object of value through impersonation).
13. 699 F.2d at 178.
14. Id.
15. Id. During the conversation between defendant Parker and the IRS agent, Parker re-
marked that Brooks owed Parker a favor, but Parker later retracted the statement indicating
that he wished he had never mentioned the IRS. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 1 (setting forth dual elements of § 912[l] violation).
19. 699 F.2d at 178.
20. Id.; see United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
21. 528 F.2d at 653.
22. Id. In United States v. Rosser, the defendant challenged his district court indictment
on the grounds that the prosecution had failed to allege "intent to defraud" as part of the offense
of false personation. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit denied Rosser's motion in holding
that after United States v. Lepowitch, "intent to defraud" is mere surplusage and not a necessary
element of the false personation offense. Id. at 656; see United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S.
702, 704 (1943); supra note 1 (stating that Lepowitch decision eliminated need for "intent to
defraud" in § 912 conviction); infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussion of Lepowitch).
The Rosser court stated that courts should treat the absence of "intent to defraud" in the 1948
revision of the false personation statute as an inadvertant error resulting from the revisers' inter-
pretation of Lepowitch. 528 F.2d at 655.
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Circuit defined the acting element of section 91211] as any assertion of authority
by an imposter, based on the position that the impersonator pretends to hold,
which the impersonator carries out by the performance of an overt act.23 The
Rosser court stated in dictum that to violate section 912[1], a defendant must
do more than merely perpetuate the masquerade as a federal officer. 24 The
District of Columbia Circuit implied that a discernable, culpable act is necessary
for a court to convict a defendant for impersonating a federal officer. 2 The
Rosser court recognized that if courts did not require a discernable, culpable
act to convict under the false personation statute, the undesirable result of
allowing the false pretense of federal authority alone to satisfy the two elements
of section 912[l] would occur.
26
While considering Parker's claim that section 912[11] prohibits only those
misrepresentations that the impersonator manifests in an overt act; the Fourth
Circuit found that the Rosser court's dictum conflicted with the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Barnow. 27 In Barnow, the defendant falsely
represented himself as a government agent empowered to sell a set of books
concerning the presidency. 28 In contrast to the Rosser court's more stringent
standard that in addition to the pretense of federal authority justice requires
a separate culpable act to convict under the false personation statute, the Bar-
now Court held that any act of an impersonator that perpetuates the false
pretense of federal authority violates section 91211].29
In determining whether Parker's actions violated the false personation
statute, the Parker court relied on case law interpreting section 912 in affirm-
ing Parker's conviction.30 The Fourth Circuit found that Parker's actions falsely
asserted the authority to investigate Brooks' tax liability, despite Parker's
absence of any overt intent to defraud.3' Because Parker misrepresented his
status affirmatively by stating that he was an IRS agent, the Fourth Circuit
determined that Parker's actions satisfied the first element of section 912[l]
23. 528 F.2d at 656.
24. Id. at 657.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See 699 F.2d at 179 n.3; see also United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74 (1915).
28. 239 U.S. at 76.
29. Id. at 77. In United States v. Barnow, the Supreme Court held that the "acts as such"
element of the false personation offense requires more than the false pretense of federal authority.
Id. The Barnow Court stated that a person must perform an act that is in keeping with the pretense
of authority in order to violate the false personation statute. Id.
30. See 699 F.2d at 179-80; see also United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1224-25 (5th
Cir. 1980) (signing register at federal penitentiary as Associate Attorney General of the United
States sufficient for conviction under § 912); United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688, 690-92
(8th Cir. 1979) (impersonating FBI agent by carrying handgun, badge, and handcuffs sufficient
for conviction under § 912); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (defen-
dant's actions of impersonating FBI agent and carrying gun sufficient for conviction under §
912); United States v. Harth, 280 F. Supp. 425, 426-27 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (impersonating IRS
agent and obtaining information from landlord concerning former tenant sufficient for convic-
tion under § 912).
31. 699 F.2d at 179.
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which requires a false pretense of federal authority. 32 Additionally, the Parker
court found that by asserting his status as an IRS agent investigating a report
of Brooks' failure to report income on the sale of firewood, Parker violated
the "acts as such" element of the crime of false personation.3 3 The Parker
court, therefore, affirmed the defendant's district court conviction because
the court found that Parker's actions violated both elements of section 912[1] .34
Before concluding that Parker violated the false personation statute, the
Parker court reasserted in dictum the principle which the Fourth Circuit
announced in United States v. Guthrie31 that "intent to defraud" is not an
element of section 912.36 In Guthrie, the defendant posed as a federal bank
examiner to defraud another of that individual's entire savings account.
37
Guthrie appealed his district court conviction under section 912 claiming that
the indictment failed to allege the element of "intent to defraud." 38 Defen-
dant Guthrie premised his appeal on the fact that prior to the 1948 revision
32. Id. The Parker court found that Parker's statement to Brooks falsely asserting the defen-
dant's affiliation with the IRS was not enough to satisfy the "acts as such" element of § 912[1].
Id.; see supra note 1 (discussing § 912[1] and stating that two separate elements of § 912[l] must
be present to convict).
33. 699 F.2d at 179.
34. Id. at 180. In Parker's appeal of his district court conviction to the Fourth Circuit,
the defendant also challenged the admission into evidence of his telephone conversation with
the IRS agent. Id. The Parker court stated that the telephone conversation between the IRS agent
and Parker conceivably could form the basis for a second court of false personation since Parker
reasserted his pretended IRS status to the IRS agent. Id. The defendant claimed that rule 404(b)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibited the introduction of Parker's telephone conversation
with the IRS agent as evidence to convict Parker for his false assertion of authority to Brooks.
Id.; see FED. R. Evm. 404(b) (evidence of other crimes only admissible to show motive, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake). The government conceded that under rule 404(b),
evidence of other crimes is not admissible to show criminal character or disposition. 699 F.2d
at 180; see FED. R. Evm. 404(b). Such evidence of other crimes, however, is admissible for the
limited purpose of showing intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. See 699
F.2d at 180; FED. R. EviD. 404(b). The Fourth Circuit found Parker's telephone conversation
with the IRS agent admissible by reasoning that the evidence illustrated Parker's identity, intent,
and knowledge of the crime as rule 404(b) permits. See 699 F.2d at 180; FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
The Fourth Circuit in Parker based its finding of admissibility of evidence of other crimes on
several other Fourth Circuit decisions. 699 F.2d at 180; see United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d
414, 416-17 (4th Cir. 1981) (admitting recent complaints of improper sexual advances to prove
defendant's intent and absence of mistake); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir.
1980) (admitting taped conversation of defendant's confession that defendant previously supplied
firearms to permit full presentation of charged offense); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127,
'134-35 (4th Cir. 1973) (admitting evidence of past violent crimes to show commonality of facts
between charged crime and past acts), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974). The Fourth Circuit
also stated that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect which oc-
curred by admitting the evidence. 699 F.2d at 180.
35. United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
36. 699 F.2d at 179.
37. 387 F.2d at 570. In United States v. Guthrie, the defendant approached Fred Stegall,
identified himself as a federal bank examiner, and falsely told Stegall that someone had misused
funds in Stegall's account. Ad. The defendant asked Stegall to withdraw the balance in Stegall's
savings account so Guthrie could discover the embezzler. Id. The defendant promised to redeposit




of the Federal Criminal Code, the false personation statute contained the phrase
"intent to defraud."' 39 The Fourth Circuit examined the 1948 revision of the
false personation statute and, like the majority of courts, determined that "in-
tent to defraud" was no longer an element of the crime of false personation.41
The Fourth Circuit decision in Guthrie that "intent to defraud" is not
an essential element of the section 912[l] offense is in accordance with each
circuit, except for the Fifth Circuit, that has considered whether "intent to
defraud" is a component of the crime of false personation.4' In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit has asserted in United States v. Randolph,4 2 the minority view
that "intent to defraud" is an essential element of the section 912[1] offense.
43
The conflict between circuits originated with the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Lepowitch.44 At the time of the Lepowitch decision, "intent
to defraud" was an element of the false personation statute.45 In Lepowitch,
while ruling on a defendant's indictment for impersonating an officer of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Supreme Court defined "intent
to defraud."'4 6 The Lepowitch Court held that "intent to defraud" occurs
when an impersonator attempts to influence his victim into following a course
of conduct that the victim would not have followed but for the impersonator's
conduct.4 7 In response to Lepowitch, the Federal Criminal Code revision com-
mittee removed the phrase "intent to defraud" from section 912 in 1948.
4
1
Without a definitive explanation, the revisers merely stated that Lepowitch
rendered the "intent to defraud" language meaningless.
49
39. Id.; see supra note I (history and congressional changes to § 912).
40. 387 F.2d at 571. After examining the 1948 revision of the false personation statute,
the Guthrie court determined that courts must recognize the international change of a statute
by Congress. Id.; see supra note 1 (discussing congressional revision of § 912). Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit stated that injury to the federal government occurs whether or not the imper-
sonator possesses a fraudulent intent. 387 F.2d at 571. The Guthrie court did state, however,
that the presence of fraudulent intent may affect the gravity of the crime of false personation. Id.
41. See United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1981) (indictment need not allege
"intent to defraud" as prerequisite to conviction under § 912); United States v. Robbins, 613
F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 654-58 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (same); United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1974) (same), vacated on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); United States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451, 453 (4th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972). But see United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 369-70 (5th
Cir. 1972) ("intent to defraud" not element of § 91211] offense); infra text accompanying notes
50-55 (discussion of Fifth Circuit's position that "intent to defraud" is element of § 912).
42. 460 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1972).
43. Id. at 370; see infra text accompanying notes 51-55 (discussion of United States v.
Randolph); see also United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 1980) (indictment
must allege intent to defraud to convict under § 912); United States v. Pollard, 486 F.2d 190,
191 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 802 (5th Cir. 1965) (same);
Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22, 26 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 859 (1965).
44. 318 U.S. 702 (1943).
45. Id. at 704.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See supra note I (discussion of 1948 revision of § 912).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976) (Historical Note explaining that "intent to defraud" language
is meaningless).
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The Fifth Circuit decisions concerning whether "intent to defraud" is an
element of the crime of false personation have indicated that Congress drafted
the statutory language of section 912 to conform to the judicial construction
that the Supreme Court mandated in the Lepowitch decision.50 In United States
v. Randolph, ' for example, the Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant's convic-
tion for drafting a letter in the falsely assumed capacity of a major in the
Untied States Army because of a faulty indictment. 2 In dictum, the Randolph
court stated that Congress did not intend to create any substantive changes
in the criminal law by revising the Federal Criminal Code. 3 The Fifth Circuit
added that the Lepowitch decision only defined the type of fraud required
under section 912 and did not render the allegation of "intent to defraud"
superfluous." Finally, the Randolph court asserted that Congress did not desire
to expand the scope of section 912 to subject a mere braggart to prosecution. 5
In contrast with the Fifth Circuit, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits comprise the majority that does not require the prosecu-
tion to prove a defendant's "intent to defraud" in order to convict under
section 912.56 The circuits that do not consider "intent to defraud" an ele-
ment of a section 912 offense follow a principle of statutory construction that
requires a court to recognize and implement Congress' intentional alteration
of statutory language." According to the majority, an impersonator damages
the dignity of the federal government whether or not the impersonator possesses
an intent to defraud.'" The majority view that "intent to defraud" is not a
requisite element of a violation under section 912111 is in accord with the general
50. See United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1972) (revisers altered
§ 912 to conform with Lepowitch); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1965)
(same).
51. 460 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 368-70. The defendant father in United States v. Randolph sent a letter to his
son in which the father stated that the army had listed the father as missing in action while serving
in Vietnam. Id. The father admitted that his purpose behind sending the letter to his son was
to avoid having to furnish child support payments to the defendant's wife. Id. at 369 n.3.
53. Id. at 370; see Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 801 (5th Cir. 1965) (revision
of Federal Criminal Code did not change substance of criminal law); see also H.R. REp. No.
304, supra note 1, at 2 (revision of Federal Criminal Code corrected awkward phraseology, reconciled
conflicting laws, and consolidated similar laws); S. REP. No. 1620, supra note 1, at 1 (revision
of Federal Criminal Code preserved original intent of Congress).
54. 460 F.2d at 370.
55. Id.; see Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1965) (revisers of §
912 did not intend for harmless bravado to constitute offense).
56. See supra note 41 (listing cases from circuits that hold "intent to defraud" is not ele-
ment of § 912).
57. See United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1981) (courts must implement
congressional elimination of "intent to defraud" ); United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12, 16 (2d
Cir. 1974) (courts must recognize intentional legislative revision of federal statute),,cert. denied,
424 U.S. 956 (1976); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir. 1967) (same), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).




policy considerations of the false personation statute." The broad purpose
of section 912 is to maintain a sense of dignity and respect for individuals
in government service and to punish the false pretense of government
authority.
6
The majority view that "intent to defraud" is not an element of the crime
of false personation, however, is in direct conflict with the intent of the 1948
revisers of the Federal Criminal Code. 6' In deleting the phrase "intent to
defraud" from section 912, the revisers of the Federal Criminal Code pro-
duced virtually no reasoning for executing the change except for the justifica-
tion that the Supreme Court definition of "intent to defraud" in Lepowitch
compelled the revisers to excise the phrase from the false personation statute.62
General commentary concerning the entire revision of the Federal Criminal
Code suggests that the revisers did not attempt to change substantively federal
criminal law. 63 Instead, congressional reports on the proposed amendments
to the Federal Criminal Code stated that the 1948 editing simply consolidated
and simplified existing sections of the federal criminal law. 64 The revisers
stressed that the revision of the Federal Criminal Code changed existing
phraseology but preserved the original intent of Congress in enacting the par-
ticular sections of the Federal Criminal Code.
65
Although the majority view that "intent to defraud" is not an element
of the false personation statute is consistent with section 912 policy considera-
tions, the Fifth Circuit minority view that "intent to defraud" remains an
element of the false personation statute is more sound. 66 In addition to having
the support of the legislative history behind the revision of the Federal Criminal
Code, Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 1948 revision support the Fifth
Circuit view. 67 The Supreme Court opinions interpreting the revision of the
59. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussion of § 912 policy considerations).
60. Id.; see United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 78 (1915) (false personation statute
punishes any false pretense of federal authority).
61. See United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 368-70 (5th Cir. 1972) (interpreting intent
of revisers of Federal Criminal Code); supra text accompanying notes 51-55 (discussion of Ran-
dolph); supra note 1 (discussion of § 912); supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussion of
revision of Federal Criminal Code).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976) (Historical Note); supra note 1 (explaining 1948 revision
of false personation statute).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 304, supra note 1, at 2 (revision of Federal Criminal Code corrected
awkward phraseology, reconciled conflicting laws and consolidated similar laws); S. RP. No.
1620, supra note 1, at 1 (revision of Federal Criminal Code preserved original intent of Congress).
64. See supra note 63 (congressional explanation for 1948 revision of Federal Criminal Code).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussion of § 912 policy considerations);
supra notes 50-55 (discussing Fifth Circuit's view that "intent to defraud" is element of § 912).
67. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 470 (1975) (legislative history must support substan-
tive change in statute); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1966) (same); Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957) (courts cannot presume substantive
change in law from statutory revision unless Congress clearly expresses intent to change law);
supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussion of intent of Federal Criminal Code revision
committee in deleting "intent to defraud" from § 912).
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Federal Criminal Code hold that a court may give effect to substantial changes
in the law that the court presumes from the rewording of a statute only if
the legislative history supports the changes." Therefore, the Fifth Circuit treats
the interpretation of the revisers that the Lepowitch decision rendered the phrase
"intent to defraud" superfluous as an unintentional error resulting from a
misunderstanding of Lepowitch because no legislative history existed to sup-
port a substantive change in the false personation state.6 9 As a result, the Fifth
Circuit views the Lepowitch decision as defining "intent to defraud.' ' 0 The
Supreme Court decision in Lepowitch merely adds substance to the "acts as
such" requirement of section 912 by equating acting with the intent to change
the course of another's conduct with the "acts as such" element. 7' The Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of the Lepowitch Court's definition of "intent to
defraud" is sound, for the requirement of an "intent to defraud" prevents
the conviction of a mere braggart." Injury to the government as a result of
the false personation of a government official does not occur as the result
of an innocent masquerade, for the impersonator intends and causes no harm."
Damage to the government only occurs when an impersonator possesses an
overt intent to defraud and seeks to change the course of another's conduct.
74
-In recognizing that the Guthrie majority view that "intent to defraud"
is not an element of a section 912[l] violation is correct, the Parker court
implicitly ignored the fact that the revisers of the Federal Criminal Code did
not intend to change the substance of federal criminal law.75 By acknowledg-
ing that "intent to defraud" is not an element of the crime of false persona-
68. See United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976); supra text accompany-
ing notes 44-49 (discussion of Lepowitch); supra note 67 (listing Supreme Court cases holding
that legislative history must support substantive change in statute for courts to recognize change).
69. See United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1972); supra text accom-
panying notes 44-49 (discussion of Lepowitch).
70. See United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1979) (Lepowitch adds substance
to "acts as such" requirement of § 912); supra text accompanying notes 44-49 (discussion of
Lepowitch).
71. See United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1979) (postulating that Fifth
Circuit could view "intent to defraud" as equivalent of "acts as such" requirement of § 912[l]);
supra text accompanying notes 43-47 (discussion of Lepowitch).
72. See United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1972) (revisers of § 912
did not intend for harmless bravado to constitute offense); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d
798, 801-03 (5th Cir. 1965) (same); supra text accompanying note 55 (courts should not interpret
§ 912 so broadly as to subject braggarts to conviction).
73. See supra text accompanying note 55 (courts should not construe § 912 so broadly that
courts subject braggarts to conviction). But see United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569, 571 (4th
Cir. 1967) (impersonator injures federal government whether or not fraudulent intent exists),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
74. See supra text accompanying note 55 (courts should not construe § 912 so broadly to
subject mere braggarts to conviction); supra text accompanying note 47 (Lepoiwitch definition
of "intent to defraud").
75. See 699 F.2d at 179 (Parker courts' recognition of Guthrie for proposition that "intent
to defraud" is not element of § 912); supra note 63 and accompanying text (1948 revision of
Federal Criminal Code did not change criminal law substantively).
[Vol. 41:491
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tion, the Fourth Circuit increased the possibility that courts will convict inno-
cent braggarts under section 912.76 The Parker court apparently realized that
Parker approached Brooks without clearly fraudulent intent.", To overcome
this obstacle, the Fourth Circuit inserted within the Parker holding a confus-
ing discussion of the "intent to defraud" issue and cited Guthrie to support
the determination that "intent to defraud" is not an element of the crime
of false personation, although Parker never raised the "intent to defraud"
issue on appeal to the Fourth Circuit."8 The Parker court effectively transfer-
red the blame for a rather harsh decision to the Federal Criminal Code revi-
sion committee, whose statutory alteration the Fourth Circuit felt compelled
to follow. 79 A comparison of the facts of Parker and the facts of cases that
the Fourth Circuit cited as support for Parker's conviction further illustrates
the severity of the Fourth Circuit's decision."0 In United States v. Cohen,8
the defendant entered a federal penitentiary under the guise of the Associate
Attorney General of the United States. 82 The defendant in United States v.
Robbins83carried a handgun, a badge, and a set of handcuffs while imper-
sonating an agent of the FBI." In United States v. Harth,85 the defendant
impersonated an IRS agent to obtain from a landlord the current address of
a former tenant."s The defendant in United States v. Hamilton87 carried a
gun while masquerading as an FBI agent. 88 The facts in Parker are
distinguishable because in Cohen, Robbins, Hamilton, and Harth the defen-
dants carried out a scheme of impersonation by asserting false authority and
by committing an additional culpable act. 89 Carrying a handgun, entering a
76. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40 (discussion of Guthrie holding that "intent
to defraud" is not element of § 912); supra text accompanying note 55 (courts should not inter-
pret § 912 so broadly that braggarts become subject to conviction).
77. See 699 F.2d at 179 (recognizing Parker approached Brooks without fraudulent intent).
78. Id. at 179. The Parker court's discussion of Guthrie and the "intent to defraud" issue
is confusing because the discussion lends no support to the Fourth Circuit's resolution of the
case. See id.; see also United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir. 1967) ("intent to
defraud" is no longer element of § 91211] offense); supra text accompanying notes 35-40 (discus-
sion of Guthrie). Parker merely argued that the government at the district court trial failed to
establish that Parker committed acts in violation of § 912. 699 F.2d at 178.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49 (discussion of Federal Criminal Code revision
committee's decision to delete "intent to defraud" from § 912); supra note 57 and accompanying
text (courts must follow intentional congressional revision of statute).
80. See supra note 30 (listing cases Fourth Circuit used as precedent for decision in Parker).
81. 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. Id. at 1224-25.
83. 613 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1979).
84. Id. at 689.
85. 280 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
86. Id. at 426 n.2.
87. 276 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1960).
88. Id. at 97.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88 (discussion of facts of cases Fourth Circuit
used as support for Parker's conviction). Other cases concerning whether a defendant's actions
satisfy the "acts as such" requirement of § 912 reinforce the premise that Parker's conviction
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federal penitentiary, and obtaining information, together are more culpable
than Parker's act of orally asserting false authority but never demanding to
see Brooks' tax return. 9 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's decision to sentence
Parker to three months in prison, appears to be too severe a punishment in
comparison with the relative harm that Parker caused. 9' Additionally, the
Parker court seemingly stretched the "acts as such" language of section 912
to convict the defendant, for Parker's statements were much less deserving
of punishment than the acts of the defendants in Cohen, Robbins, Hamilton,
and Harth.92
The Fourth Circuit in Parker adhered to the general policy considerations
inherent in section 912 to convict the defendant for impersonating an IRS
agent. 93 In citing the Guthrie holding, the Parker court reasserted that "intent
to defraud" is not an element of the crime of impersonation of a federal officer
under section 912 in the Fourth Circuit.94 By recognizing that "intent to
defraud" is not an element of a section 912 offense, the Fourth Circuit
disregarded the fact that the Federal Criminal Code revision committee did
not seek to amend substantively federal criminal law in 1948. 91 Because the
Fourth Circuit did not recognize "intent to defraud" as an element of the
crime of false personation, prosecutors will find it relatively simple to obtain
indictments against defendant who impersonate federal officers but who do
not exhibit overtly a desire to change the course of conduct of another. Until
is severe. See, e.g., United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1978) (conviction
of debt collectors for representing themselves as postal officers over telephone to obtain con-
fidential information); United States v. Etheridge, 512 F.2d 1249, 1250 (2d Cir.) (defendant presented
self as member of United States Army to obtain Emergency Relief Loan), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
843 (1975); Thomas v. United States, 213 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1954) (court convicted defendant
for representing self as United States Senator in telegram ordering stay of execution); Dickson
v. Untied States, 182 F.2d 131, 132 (10th Cir. 1950) (court convicted defendant for representing
self as federal officer to force another into car under pretense of transporting to office to discuss
tax deficiency); Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 382 (1st Cir. 1948) (masquerading as
War Department officer and placing telephone call in official manner to influence another party
sufficient for conviction). But cf. United States v. Harmon, 496 F.2d 20, 20-21 (2d Cir.) (defen-
dant's statement that he was Air Force sergeant on leave was not sufficient to convict since indict-
ment charged no overt act), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); United States v. York, 202 F.
Supp. 275, 276-77 (E.D. Va. 1962) (falsely representing FBI employment on credit application
not sufficient to convict); United States v. Larson, 125 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Alaska 1954) (court
acquitted defendant for masquerading as FBI officer since indictment charged no overt act).
90. See 699 F.2d at 177-78 (discussion of facts in Parker); supra text accompanying notes
81-88 (discussion of facts of cases Fourth Circuit used as support for Parker's conviction).
91. See 699 F.2d at 178 (court sentenced Parker to three months imprisonment); supra
text accompanying notes 80-92 (comparing facts of Parker to more culpable facts of other §
912 decisions).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 2 & 57-60 (discussion of policy considerations behind
§ 912).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40 (discussion of Guthrie).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55 (discussion of intent of revision committee
in deleting "intent to defraud" from § 912).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40 (discussion of Fourth Circuit's holding in
Guthrie that "intent to defraud" is not element of § 912 offense).
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the Fourth Circuit amends its belief that "intent to defraud" is not an ele-
ment of a section 912 offense, the danger will exist that mere braggarts like
Parker will be subject to conviction under the false personation statute in the
Fourth Circuit.
JEFFREY J. GIGUERE
D. Testimony of Volunteer Prison Informant Does Not
Violate Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides criminal defendants with the right to
counsel.' The sixth amendment right to counsel applies to state and federal
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all prosecutions,
the accused shall... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id. See generally P. LEWIs
& K. PEOPLES, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 549 (1979) (right to counsel has roots
in Middle Ages) [hereinafter cited as LEwis & PEOPLES].
Although the right to counsel had achieved considerable importance in England by the fifteenth
century, two common-law developments stunted the evolution of that right. Id. at 549-50. First,
the appearance of the distinction between matters of law and matters of fact negatively affected
the availability of the right to counsel. Id. at 550. The distinction between law and fact required
a defendant to present his version of the facts to the court without the aid of counsel. Id. The
defendant's attorney then would apply the law to the facts as presented by the accused. Id. The
distinction between law and fact detracted from the right to counsel by prohibiting legal represen-
tation during a substantial and crucial part of the trial. Id. The second development that slowed
the availability of counsel was the English courts' refusal to permit any legal representation to
a felony defendant. Id. Although the courts disallowed the assistance of counsel to suspected
felons, on factual matters, the English did allow suspected misdemeanants to enlist the aid of
counsel. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERicAN COURTS, 8-9 (1955) (English courts'
view that felony defendant was more dangerous than misdemeanor defendant constitutes partial
explanation for distinction between felony and misdemeanor); cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 306-07 (1973) (rule that allows accused misdemeanant full benefit of counsel while restricting
accused felon to consultation only on purely legal questions is absurd); W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIEs 355 (Blackstone criticized rule that denied assistance of counsel to save a man's life
yet conferred right to counsel upon defendant standing trial for petty trespass). See generally
Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV. 559, 560-61
(1950-51) (discussing justifications and criticisms of rule by English commentators).
The thirteen original American states rejected the restrictive English rule pertaining to right
to counsel with the adoption of the sixth amendment in 1791. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 61-65 (1932) (discussing circumstances surrounding ratification of sixth amendment and state
constitutional provisions for right to counsel); see also Note, An Historical Argument for the
Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 Yale L. J. 1000, 1033 (1964) (eleven of thirteen
states had abolished law-fact distinction by time of sixth amendment's proposal). By 1800, the
majority of state constitutions included some provision for the right to counsel in felony cases.
Id at 1030-31. See generally Rackow, The Right to Counsel-English and American Precedents,
I1 WNI. & MARY QUART. 1, 21-26 (1954) (legislative history behind sixth amendment).
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Powell v. Alabama that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment guaranteed the assistance of counsel to an ignorant
state defendant in a capital case. 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932). In Powell, the state arrested seven
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prosecutions.2 If a defendant cannot afford to retain a lawyer, the govern-
ment must provide counsel to defend the accused.' Once the government for-
mally charges a defendant, the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches. 4
black indigent defendants and charged them with rape. Id. at 49. The trial judge appointed all
attorneys of the local bar to represent the defendants at arraignment. Id. Since the court failed
to specify a particular attorney for each defendant, members of the local bar declined to assist
the defendants at arraignment. See id. at 50-51 (discussing racial prejudice and white outrage
surrounding trial of black defendants in Powell for rape of white girls). The court, however,
did specify attorneys of record on the morning of the trial. Id. at 57. Nonetheless, the only lawyer
who showed concern for the plight of the defendants in Powell was an out-of-state attorney,
unfamiliar with Alabama law and reluctant to assume total responsibility for the defense. See
id. at 57 (out-of-state attorney informed court that he wished only to assist attorneys of record).
The court convicted the defendants in a one-day trial and sentenced them to death. Id at 50.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the concept of due process of law included the effective
assistance of counsel provided for in the sixth amendment. Id. at 66-68. The Powell Court stated
that the right to appointed counsel was a logical corollary of the right to counsel. Id. at 72.
The Court therefore held that in a capital case a trial court must appoint counsel for a defendant
whose ignorance renders him unable to defend himself. Id. at 71.
Not until 1963 did the Supreme Court recognize the general right to counsel in state trials
as constitutionally protected. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (sixth amend-
ment right to counsel in felony trials is obligatory on state courts through due process clause
of fourteenth amendment). See generally Lwis & PEOPLES, supra at 549-50 (discussing right to
counsel in American courts); Clark, Gideon Revisited, 15 Aiuz. L. Rav. 343, 343-47 (1973) (same);
Comment, The Further Expansion of the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel During Inter-
rogations: United States v. Henry, 8 PEPPERDINE L. Rav. 451, 453-57 (1981) (general history
of sixth amendment right to counsel) [hereinafter cited as Further Expansion]; infra notes 2-7
(discussing cases that construe right to counsel in state and federal court).
2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel
applies to all state felony trials through fourteenth amendment due process clause). Prior to Gideon,
the Court predicated violations of the right to counsel in state courts solely on the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (due
process clause requires counsel at arraignment because Alabama law requires defendant to plead
insanity defense at arraignment or else forfeit opportunity to assert insanity as defense); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (extensive and coercive interrogation of defendant in
absence of counsel violates due process); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958) (admission
of voluntary confession of law-school trained defendant made in absence of counsel does not
violate due process of law). In federal cases, conversely, the Supreme Court examined violations
of the right to counsel under the explicit provisions of the sixth amendment. See Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (trial court must appoint counsel to defend indigent accused
who is unable to procure own counsel).
3. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (defendant possesses right to court-
appointed counsel in state as well as federal felony trials); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
468 (1938) (indigent felony defendant in federal trial has right to court-appointed counsel unless
defendant knowingly and intelligently waives right to counsel). The Supreme Court has extended
the right to counsel to all indigent misdemeanor defendants faced with a potential jail sentence.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972) (legal questions involved in petty and misde-
meanor offenses also require presence of counsel to ensure fair trial). But cf. Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (state need not appoint counsel if court does not imprison defendant
for commission of misdemeanor). See generally C. WHisBmaAD, CwABNL PROCEDUE-AN
ANALYSIS OF CoNsnrrtrnoNAL CASES AND CONCEPTS §§ 25.01-25.04 (1980) (actual imprisonment
is penalty quite different from fines or threat of imprisonment).
4. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (sixth amendment does not apply
until criminal prosecution of defendant commences). In Kirby, the government placed an
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Violation of the right to counsel occurs whenever the government denies legal
representation to a defendant at a critical stage of the prosecution.' The Con-
stitution prohibits the government from deliberately eliciting incriminating
statements from a defendant in the absence of counsel.' The government also
unrepresented defendant in an identification line-up six weeks before indicting the defendant.
Id. at 685. The Supreme Court held that because the government had not indicted the defendant
prior to the line-up, the guarantees of the sixth amendment did not attach and the defendant
had no right to counsel at the line-up. Id. at 690. The Kirby Court designated the formal charging
of the defendant as the point at which the sixth amendment attaches because the formal charge
represents the government's affirmative step into its prosecution of the defendant. Id. at 689.
In Kirby, the Court stated that only after indictment is the assistance of counsel necessary to
protect a defendant faced with the complexities of the criminal justice system. Id. Consultation
with counsel after indictment is vital to an adequate defense since lack of proper investigation
and preparation during pretrial proceedings may render the assistance of counsel at trial mean-
ingless. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-71 (1932) (failure of trial court to make effective
appointment of counsel at arraignment constitutes denial of due process).
5. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (preliminary hearing is critical stage
since prejudice at trial could result from denial of counsel at hearing); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (possible suggestiveness of postindictment fine-up makes presence
of counsel necessary to ensure defendant receives fair trial); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
486 (1964) (police interrogation of defendant on whom criminal investigation has focused is critical
stage requiring presence of counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (postin-
dictment interrogation of defendant is critical stage); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54
(1962) (arraignment is critical stage requiring presence of counsel); see also Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (some pretrial proceedings are so critical that absence of counsel could
prejudice entire trial). The determination of whether a particular proceeding is a critical stage
depends on the potential for prejudice to a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and
the apparent ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1, 9 (1970) (preliminary hearing provides counsel with opportunity to examine witnesses and discover
case against accused as means to prepare proper defense for accused). See generally C. W\ BREAD,
supra note 3, § 25.03 at 535-36 (listing cases that involve sixth amendment right to counsel);
Further Expansion, supra note 1, at 462 (discussing criteria that determine whether stage is critical).
Conversely, the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach to proceedings that are
not critical to a proper defense. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 102, 122 (1975) (preliminary
hearing conducted to determine probable cause to detain accused is not critical stage that requires
assistance of counsel); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973) (photo display is not critical
stage because defendant is not present and no danger exists that his lack of familiarity with lav
will prejudice his defense); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (no automatic right
to counsel exists at probation revocation hearing unless defendant first shows that due process
requires representation); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (preindictment show-up is
not critical stage since prosecution has not initiated formal proceedings against defendant); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (taking of defendant's blood and fingerprints presents
no risk of prejudice that counsel could offset). See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, §
25.03 at 535-36 (cases involving determination of critical stages in sixth amendment context).
6. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). In Massiah, the government employed
a codefendant informer to meet with Massiah while the defendants were on bail awaiting trial.
Id. at 202-03. The government surreptitiously recorded the conversation between the two and
introduced Massiah's self-incriminatory remarks into evidence at his trial. Id. at 203. The Supreme
Court ruled that the government's deliberate elicitation of the statements from Massiah violated
his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 206. The Massiah Court relied on Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), for the proposition that the Constitution guarantees a defendant the
aid of counsel during police interrogation. Id. at 204.
Since Massiah was under indictment at the time the government elicited the incriminating
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violates the sixth amendment if authorities create a situation that is likely to
cause a defendant to make self-incriminating statements without the presence
of counsel.' In Thomas v. Cox,' the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
admission of a prison informant's testimony violates a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. 9
In Thomas, Virginia police officers arrested the defendant and charged
him with the murder of his girlfriend's mother.'I While Thomas was in pretrial
confinement, Thomas spoke on several occasions with a fellow inmate named
Gregory." Thomas made a series of self-incriminating statements to Gregory
during the course of their conversations. 2 Gregory later repeated these
statements to an investigator from the sheriff's office.' 3 Gregory and the in-
statements, the Court concluded that the government had violated Massiah's right to counsel.
Id. at 206. The Massiah Court relied directly on the sixth amendment. Id. at 205. The Spano
Court, however, had held the defendant's confession inadmissible because the government obtained
the confession from the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (Spano Court declined opportunity
to analyze defendant's right to counsel in sixth amendment terms). See generally Kamisar, Brewer
v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter? 67 GEO.
L. J. 1, 81-101 (1978) (demarcating commencement of judicial proceedings as dividing line bet-
ween fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel is illogical).
The presence of counsel after indictment is necessary to enable a defendant to plead in-
telligently and present a proper defense. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per
curiam). Allowing the assistance of counsel to the defendant in Massiah may not have helped
the defendant because the presence of government agents was surreptitious. See Kamisar, supra,
at 59. Assistance of counsel was vital nonetheless because counsel could have cancelled the meeting
with the codefendant. See Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitu-
tional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1979) (Con-
stitution mandates strict adherence with sixth amendment right to counsel) [hereinafter cited as
Need to Reconsider].
7. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980); see infra notes 26-45 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Henry); see also Comment, United States v.
Henry: Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Government Informants Once Criminal Pro-
ceedings Have Commenced, 7 NEw ENG. J. PRIsoN LAw 117, 142 (1981) (Henry strongly reaffirms
Massiah holding that Constitution prohibits government from deliberately eliciting incriminating
statements from defendant in absence of counsel) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limitations].
8. 708 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 284 (1983).
9. Id. at 134-37.
10. Id. at 133. In Thomas, the murderer strangled the victim with a shoelace before running
over her body with an automobile. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Brief for Appellee at 5. In Thomas, the celmate informant, Gregory, mentioned
to the defendant, Thomas, that Gregory had heard that the murderer had strangled and raped
the victim before running her over with the car. Id. Thomas responded by denying that he had
raped the victim. Id. at 6. Thomas also confided to Gregory that the police had caught him
at a roadblock. Id. Thomas told Gregory that Thomas' relatives would provide him with an
alibi that would result in Thomas' acquittal. Id. In addition, Thomas admitted to Gregory that
he had murdered the victim with the assistance of his girlfriend. Id.
13. 708 F.2d at 133. In Thomas, Gregory was in court on a sentencing matter when he
asked an investigator about the Thomas case. Id. When the investigator told Gregory that the
prosecution had postponed Thomas' trial, Gregory expressed his belief that Thomas was guilty.
Id. Gregory then repeated Thomas' incriminating statements to the investigator. Id.
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vestigator did not enter into any agreement by which Gregory would provide
the Commonwealth with additional information." A week later, though,
Gregory showed a state police investigator a sheet of paper on which Gregory
had recorded numerous damaging admissions made by Thomas.'" The state
police investigator told Gregory not to question Thomas.6 The investigator,
however, did instruct Gregory to remain alert for any additional incriminating
statements that Thomas might make. '" During the next several weeks, Gregory
took handwritten notes of over twelve additional incriminating remarks made
by Thomas.' 8 The statements that Gregory recorded included several direct
admissions by Thomas that he was guilty of the murder.' 9
The state trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce Gregory's
testimony despite Thomas' objection that the Commonwealth had obtained
the evidence in contravention of his sixth amendment right to counsel.2" Thomas
14. Id. In Thomas, Gregory declined an invitation from the investigator to talk with the
Commonwealth's Attorney. Id.
15. Id. In Thomas, the statements that Gregory showed the state police investigator were
the same statements Gregory had repeated to the sheriff's office investigator the week before.
Id. The investigator from the sheriff's office had told the state police investigator about the in-
formation that Gregory possessed. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The fact that the state police investigator in Thomas instructed Gregory not to ques-
tion Thomas indicates that the investigator was aware that an active effort by Gregory to elicit
additional statements from Thomas might affect the admissibility of Gregory's testimony. See
id. (investigator told Gregory not to ask questions but to listen to anything Thomas might say
pertaining to crime); see also infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text (discussing conduct of
informant in United States v. Henry that Court considered violative of defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel).
18. 708 F.2d at 133.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 134. In Thomas, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the
court ruled Gregory's testimony admissible on the strength of the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). Id. The issue
before the Fourth Circuit in Henry was whether admission of a prison informant's testimony
regarding incriminating statements made to the informant by the defendant violated the sixth
amendment. Henry, 590 F.2d at 546. In Henry, the government arrested the defendant and plac-
ed him in jail with an informant whom the government employed on a contingent-fee basis for
providing incriminating information obtained from other inmates. Id. at 545. The government
instructed the informant not to question the defendant in Henry but to remain alert for anything
the defendant said concerning the crime. Id. In Henry, the Fourth Circuit found the informant's
testimony inadmissible because the government had employed the defendant to elicit incriminating
statements from the defendant. Id. at 547. The informant obtained the incriminating information
after the defendant's indictment and while the defendant was in jail without the aid of counsel.
Id. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the informant's conversations with the defendant amounted
to interrogation in violation of the sixth amendment. Id.; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 399 (1977) (police conduct designed to elicit incriminating responses from defendant is equivalent
of interrogation for sixth amendment purposes).
The sixth amendment right to counsel is separate and distinct from the right to counsel derived
from the voluntariness requirement of the fifth amendment. Compare Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (government's deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements from
defendant after indictment in absence of counsel violates sixth amendment right to counsel) with
Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (fifth amendment requires court to suppress
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appealed his subsequent murder conviction to the Virginia Supreme Court,
which dismissed Thomas' petition for appeal."1 Thomas then sought federal
habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia.2" The district court ddtermined that Gregory did not act under
government instructions and that Gregory had not agreed to provide the govern-
ment with the information he obtained from Thomas. 23 Since Gregory was
not a government agent, the district court concluded that the Commonwealth
had not violated Thomas' sixth amendment right to counsel.
2 4
evidence of defendant's confession that police obtained from in-custody suspect after ignoring
suspect's request for counsel). Under Miranda, the police must advise the suspect of his right
to have counsel present during interrogation. Id. at 444; see also id. at 444-45 (discussing addi-
tional warnings that police must give to suspect before questioning may proceed). Law enforce-
ment officers violate the fifth amendment when they interrogate a defendant without advising
him of his Miranda rights, or obtaining an intelligent waiver of those rights. Id. at 444.
The prosecution may not use any statements made by the defendant against him at trial
unless the prosecution demonstrates that the police followed the Miranda safeguards against self-
incrimination. Id. The failure of arresting officers to advise a suspect of his right to counsel
under Miranda, however, does not amount to a sixth amendment violation. See 2 W. RiNGEL,
SEARcHms & SEiZUREs, AlRRSTS & CONFESSIONS, § 24.4 at 24-9 (2d ed. 1983) (failure to inform
suspect of Miranda right to counsel does not violate sixth amendment). Such a failure will in-
dicate that the suspect did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination. Id. § 24.4 at 24-10. Under the fifth amendment, the absence
of an intelligent waiver will negate the voluntariness and hence, admissibility, of any subsequent
admissions. See 384 U.S. at 445; 2 W. RiNGEL, supra, § 24.4 at 24-10.
The fifth amendment right to counsel developed as a procedural safeguard against coerced
confessions. See 2 W. RINGEL, supra § 24.3 at § 24-8 (Miranda decision arguably rests on tenuous
grounds because its requirements are as much procedural as constitutional). The sixth amend-
ment right to counsel is a specifically enumerated constitutional right. See supra notes 1-7 (discussing
history of sixth amendment right to counsel). See generally Kamisar, supra note 6, at 37-55 (com-
paring fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel); 2 W. RINOEL, supra, at §§ 24-31 (discussing
right to counsel in relation to police interrogation under Miranda and Massiah).
21. 708 F.2d at 134.
22. Id. Habeas corpus is a form of extraordinary judicial relief that requires the govern-
ment to show cause for detaining a prisoner. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 53
at 332 (4th ed. 1983). Congress has authorized the federal courts to grant habeas corpus to any
person whose liberty a state government has restrained in violation of federal law. Id. at 330-31.
The writ of habeas corpus is an essential remedy to protect citizens from imprisonment by
the state in violation of their constitutional rights. See Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950).
Congress has provided state prisoners the opportunity to file for federal habeas corpus relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (rules governing issuance of federal writ of habeas
corpus). Federal courts will receive habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners only when the
petitioner claims some state violation of his federal constitutional rights. Id. § 2254(a). Federal
courts will refuse to grant petitions unless the prisoner has exhausted all available state remedies.
Id. § 2254(b); see also Ex Parle Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-18 (1944) (per curiam) (failure of state
courts to adjudicate defendant's federal contentions fully and fairly justifies issuance of writ
of habeas corpus). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra, at 330-46 (discussing cases that interpret
availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners).
23. 708 F.2d at 134.
24. Id. In Thomas, the district court made several factual determinations pertaining to
Thomas' sixth amendment claim. Id. First, the court found that Gregory was not under the con-
trol of the Commonwealth. Id. Second, the district court concluded that Gregory did not agree
to assist in the Thomas prosecution by obtaining the incriminating statements from Thomas.
Id. Finally, the court determined that the state did not place Gregory near Thomas in the jail
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's
denial of habeas corpus relief. 25 The Thomas court concluded that the govern-
ment did not infringe upon Thomas' right to counsel by distinguishing
Gregory's status from the status of the informant in United States v. Henry.2 6
In Henry, the government arrested and indicted the defendant for armed
robbery. 2" The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) contacted a paid infor-
mant incarcerated in the same jail with the defendant and instructed the in-
formant to listen closely for any statements made by federal prisoners. 28 The
FBI did not specify any of the prisoners by name except for the defendant. 29
to facilitate his conversations with Thomas. Id. From these factual conclusions, the district court
in Thomas decided that Gregory did not operate as an agent of the government during his conver-
sations with Thomas. Id.
The government's intentional placement of an informant in close proximity to a defendant,
by itself, does not constitute deprivation of an inmate's sixth amendment right to counsel. See
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 276 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (government's use
of passive listening device to collect incriminating statements from defendant does not violate
sixth amendment). The Massiah prohibition against the use of incriminating statements applies
to statements that the government intentionally elicits from a defendant, but not to spontaneous
statements made by the defendant. Id.; see also supra note 6 (discussing Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Massiah v. United States).
The routine electronic recording of conversations between inmates and their visitors does
not infringe upon an inmate's sixth amendment right to counsel. See United States V. Hearst,
563 F.2d 1331, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). In Hearst, the Ninth
Circuit held that the introduction into evidence of a defendant's incriminating statements recorded
by prison officials was proper because the government had made no attempt to induce the defen-
dant to incriminate herself. Id. The Hearst court cited the government's weighty interest in prison
security as a justification for permitting prison officials to monitor conversations between in-
mates and visitors. Id. at 1345-46. The Hearst court upheld the admissibility of the recorded
conversations since the government had not interrogated the defendant either surreptitiously or
formally. Id. at 1348.
The Second Circuit has held that the placement of a government informant in a defendant's
cell to listen for the identity of a defendant's partners in crime does not violate the sixth amend-
ment. See Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1190 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945
(1979). In Wilson, instead of divulging the names of his cohorts to the informant, the defendant
made unsolicited, self-incriminatory remarks to the informant. Id. at 1191. The informant testified
about the incriminating statements at the defendant's trial. Id. The Wilson court concluded that
use of the informant's testimony did not violate the sixth amendment because the informant
had not tried to elicit the statements from the defendant. Id.; see also United States v. Fioravanti,
412 F.2d 407, 413 & n.15 (3d Cir.) (no sixth amendment violation occurs when defendant freely
volunteers incriminating statement to undercover agent whom government deliberately arrested
along with defendant), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
25. 708 F.2d at 137.
26. See id. at 136; 447 U.S. 264 (1980). The United States Supreme Court heard the Henry
case on appeal from the Fourth Circuit. Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); see infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text (Supreme Court affirmed
Fourth Circuit decision in Henry); see also supra note 6 (discussing Massiah's prohibition against
government elicitation of statements from defendant in absence of counsel).
27. 447 U.S. at 265-66.
28. Id. at 266. In Henry, the FBI had employed the informant for an unspecified length
of time prior to using the informant to obtain information from the defendant. Id. An FBI agent
instructed the informant not to question or initiate conversation with the defendant in Henry. Id.
29. Id.
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The informant operated on a contingent-fee basis, receiving payment only when
he provided the FBI with useful information.3" The informant emerged from
jail approximately one month later with statements that the defendant had
made that implicated the defendant in the bank robbery.3' With the assistance
of the informant's testimony, the government convicted the defendant of bank
robbery.32 The defendant later learned that the inmate was a paid government
informant and attacked his conviction collaterally. 33 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas corpus in Henry on the
grounds that use of the informant's testimony violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel.
34
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding in Henry because
the government intentionally created a situation that was likely to induce the
defendant to make incriminating remarks in the absence of counsel.3 The
Court emphasized that the government specifically commissioned the infor-
mant to obtain information from the defendant. 36 The Henry Court also noted
that the defendant was unaware that the inmate was a government informant.
37
30. Id.
31. Id. at 266-67.
32. Id. In Henry, the informant testified that during conversations with the defendant,
the defendant stated that he had made several trips to the bank to observe employee security
procedures. Id. The defendant also described details of the robbery to the informant. Id. The
prosecution did not tell the jury that the government had paid the informant for his testimony. Id.
33. Id. at 268. In Henry, the defendant petitioned for a writ of federal habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Id. at 267-68. The defendant based his petition on
a claim that the use of the informant's testimony violated his sixth amendment right to counsel.
Id. The district court denied the defendant's petition. Id. See generally supra note 22 (discussing
habeas corpus remedy with emphasis on state prisoner relief).
34. 447 U.S. at 268. In Henry, the Fourth Circuit initially reversed and remanded the district
court's holding for an evidentiary determination of whether the informant acted as a government
agent during his interviews with the defendant. Id. On remand, the district court again denied
the defendant's habeas corpus petition because the FBI had instructed the informant not to ques-
tion the defendant. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded that holding on the basis of
the Supreme Court's holding in Massiah, which prohibits the government from eliciting statements
from a defendant after indictment when the defendant does not have the benefit of counsel.
Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); see also
supra notes 6-7 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Massiah and Henry).
35. 447 U.S. at 274.
36. Id. at 270. The Henry Court viewed the contingent-fee arrangement as sufficient to
support the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the informant acted as an agent of the government.
Id. at 270-71. The Supreme Court stated that the FBI agent who instructed the informant not
to question the defendant in Henry could assume that the contingent-fee arrangement nonetheless
would motivate the informant to seek information from the defendant. Id. at 271. The Henry
Court refused to accept the government's argument that Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977),
modified the deliberate elicitation test of Massiah. Id.; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 400 (1977) (sixth amendment right to counsel applies whether government interrogates defendant
surreptitiously or directly). The Henry Court therefore concluded that the informant's conversa-
tions with the defendant violated the sixth amendment. 447 U.S. at 274; see also Kamisar, supra
note 6, at 33-44 (Kamisar examines Supreme Court's reasoning in Massiah and Brewer and con-
cludes that actual interrogation nedd not be present to violate sixth amendment).
37. 447 U.S. at 272.
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Finally, the Henry Court stressed that the defendant was under indictment
and in custody when the informant elicited the incriminating statements.3 8 The
Supreme Court concluded that the government's use of the paid informant
violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.3 9
In Henry, the Supreme Court observed that additional, admissible evidence
existed to support the defendant's conviction."0 Included in this evidence was
the testimony of a second cellmate whose neutrality was not in question.4 '
The Henry Court thus implicitly approved the admission of the neutral in-
mate's testimony. 2 The Court acknowledged that the government's strong
evidence apparently was sufficient to convict the defendant without the use
of the paid informant's testimony.4 3 The Court in Henry, however, was not
willing to overturn the Fourth Circuit's finding that the wrongful admission
of the paid informant's testimony was not harmless error." Accordingly, the
Henry Court affirmed the reversal of the defendant's conviction because the
government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the paid infor-
mant's testimony did not influence the jury's verdict.
4 5
Although several factual similarities exist between the Thomas case and
the Henry case,' 6 the Fourth Circuit distinguished the Thomas case from Henry
by holding that Gregory was not a government agent during the period of
his incarceration with Thomas.4 7 As opposed to the paid informant in Henry,
the Thomas court determined that Gregory was a self-initiated informant,
motivated by conscience rather than governmental reward.4 8 The Fourth Cir-
38. Id. The Supreme Court determined that Henry was distinguishable from cases in which
the state uses undercover informants before the state files charges against a suspect. Id.; see also
supra note 20 (discussing difference between fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel).
39. 447 U.S. at 274.
40. Id. at 274-75 n.13.
41. Id. at 267 n.3. In Henry, the government did not pay a second inmate for testifying.
Id. The second inmate also had no prior arrangement with the government to testify. Id.
42. 447 U.S. at 274-75 n.13; see also United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.)
(Calder court cited Henry as implicit support for admissibility of neutral inmate's testimony),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
43. U.S. at 274-75 n.13.
44. Id.
45. Id. Appellate courts must reverse a conviction on appeal unless the record demonstrates
beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of illegally obtained evidence did not influence the
jury's verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
46. 708 F.2d at 134-35. In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit noted that the defendants in Henry
and Thomas were both under indictment and in prison at the time they made the incriminating
statements to the informants. Id. at 134. The government in each case instructed the informant
not to interrogate the defendant but to remain alert for any statements the defendant might make.
Id. In addition, both defendants perceived the informants as fellow inmates. Id.
47. Id. at 137; see infra notes 48-68 (discussing Thomas court's analysis of informant's
conduct).
48. 708 F.2d at 135-36. In Thomas, the evidence convinced the court that Gregory's motivation
to testify was personal. Id. Since the Fourth Circuit's examination of the state court record revealed
ample support for the district court's conclusions, the Thomas court refused to disturb those
findings. Id. at 135 n.3; see Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1979) (district court
findings based solely on state court record permit appellate court to make its own determination);
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cuit observed that Gregory offered to provide evidence of Thomas' guilt strictly
for personal reasons, in contrast with the type of prearrangement present in
Henry.49 Since the Commonwealth did not exercise control over Gregory, the
Thomas court found that Gregory's actions were not attributable to the
government.51
Having determined that Gregory was a private informer, the Thomas court
stated that surreptitious interrogation of a defendant by a private citizen will
not violate the sixth amendment unless the citizen acts as a government agent.I'
The Fourth Circuit explained that no "bright-line test" existed to determine
whether a private citizen is a government agent. 2 Under a general guideline
extracted from the Henry decision, the Thomas court suggested that an infor-
mant is a government agent when government instruction dictated the rela-
tionship between authorities and the informant.13 According to the Thomas
court, the casual encounter between Gregory and the state official did not
violate the sixth amendment right to counsel as interpreted in Henry. 4 The
Fourth Circuit held that Gregory's actions did not implicate the state because
there existed no evidence that Gregory operated on a quidpro quo basis with
the Commonwealth. 5 The Thomas court refused to extend the rule in Henry
to instances when an inmate-informant voluntarily assists the government by
providing evidence of a fellow inmate's inculpatory remarks. 6
In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit properly distinguished the case before the
bench from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Henry.5 ' Although
the Henry Court analyzed the actions of an informant to determine whether
the informant had elicited information in violation of the defendant's right
to counsel, the informant's status as a government agent was not at issue in
Henry.5 8 Rather, the Henry Court assumed that since the government paid
cf. FED. R. Cr. P. 52(a) (federal appellate courts will not set aside factual determinations of
court of original jurisdiction unless those findings appear clearly erroneous).




53. Id at 137.
54. Id. In Henry, the Fourth Circuit perceived informant activity as ranging from strictly
private action to conduct that the government directly controls. Id. While refraining from defin-
ing exactly where on this scale the protections of the sixth amendment apply the Thomas court
concluded that Gregory's actions more closely resembled private action than the government in-
volvement the Supreme Court rejected in Henry. Id. The Thomas. court therefore decided that
Gregory was not a government agent because no prearrangement or ongoing cooperation existed
between the state and Gregory. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit noted other circuit court decisions that have addressed
whether a volunteer informant's testimony is admissible absent evidence reflecting government
involvement. See infra notes 68-94 and accompanying text (discussing other circuit court deci-
sions that have considered claims of sixth amendment infringement due to actions of informants).
57. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (analysis of Fourth Circuit's decision in
Thomas under criteria Supreme Court enunciated in Henry).
58. See 708 F.2d at 135 n.2. (Henry Court assumed existence of agency relationship from
government's previous employment of informant and existence of contingent-fee arrangement).
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the informant for providing information, the informant was a government
agent. 9 In Thomas, however, the court examined whether the informant was
a government agent at the time he elicited the incriminating statements from
the accused."
Although the Thomas court distinguished Henry, the court properly com-
pared Gregory to the informant in Henry and properly concluded that Gregory
was not a government agent.6 ' Unlike the Henry informant, the government
did not pay Gregory in return for his testimony. 62 Conditioning payment on
the informant's production of useful information creates a presumption that
the person will act affirmatively to obtain the evidence. 63 Further, Gregory
did not receive any preferred treatment, such as a sentence reduction, in return
for his testimony.64 In Thomas, the record strongly supports the Fourth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that Gregory informed on Thomas strictly for personal reasons




As a volunteer witness in Thomas, Gregory's testimony is similar to the
testimony of the neutral witness whose testimony the Supreme Court approved
in Henry.6  The Supreme Court's admission of the neutral inmate's testimony
supports the Thomas court's approval of Gregory's testimony.67 Since the
testimony of an informant with no connection to the government, such as
Gregory, does not infringe upon a defendant's constitutional rights, the Thomas
court rightfully rejected Thomas' sixth amendment claim.
6
1
59. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980).
60. 708 F.2d at 135-37.
61. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas court's decision in
light of Supreme Court's holding in Henry).
62. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 266 (1980) (government paid Henry infor-
mant in return for his testimony).
63. See id. at 270-71 (1980) (conditioning payment upon production of useful evidence makes
informant more likely to seek information from defendant).
64. 708 F.2d at 135. In Thomas the evidence clearly demonstrated that the government
did not reward Gregory for testifying. Id. In addition, Gregory served his entire sentence for
auto theft. Id.; cf. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (testimony of
informant whose freedom on parole hinged upon his production of incriminating information
from defendant is inadmissible).
65. 708 F.2d at 135-37. Compare Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1983) (district
court determined that informant had no arrangement to provide information nor had informant
anything to gain by providing information) with United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71
(1980) (informant received payment upon production of incriminating statements of accused).
66. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing Henry Court's tacit approval
of neutral witness' testimony).
67. Id.
68. Id. Before federal courts will rule an informant's testimony inadmissible on the basis
of the sixth amendment as interpreted in Henry, the evidence must show that the informant acted
under government instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Henry prohibition is inapplicable when defendant fails to demonstrate that informant acted as
government agent); United States v. Van Scoy, 654 F.2d 257, 260 (3d Cir.) (no violation of sixth
amendment exists when informant willingly provides information without government instruc-
tion), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981); United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.) (Henry
Court implicitly has approved admissibility of testimony of neutral inmate), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 912 (1981).
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The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the sixth amendment issue in Thomas
also is consistent with the positions of other circuits that have considered
whether an informant has acted as a government agent in a post-indictment
setting.69 Unlike previous Supreme Court decisions, several circuit court opi-
nions directly address the agency status of an informant to whom a defendant
has made incriminating remarks." In United States v. Malik,7 ' the Seventh
Circuit considered a situation in which the defendant made incriminating
statements to a fellow inmate who later repeated the statements to an FBI
agent.7" The Malik court determined that the informant did not operate as
a government agent despite the fact that the FBI previously had employed
him as a paid informant. 3 Since the FBI had terminated the informant's agency
status, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the informant acted independently
at the time Malik incriminated himself.
74
As the Henry Court noted, the government's prior employment of an in-
formant creates a presumption that the informant continues to operate as a
government agent. 7" The facts in Malik, therefore, indicate a greater degree
of-government involvement than the circumstances surrounding Gregory's
testimony in Thomas.76 Notwithstanding the existence of the past relationship
between the informant and the FBI in Malik, the Seventh Circuit held that
Henry did not require suppression of the informant's testimony.77 Like the
Fourth Circuit in Thomas, the Malik court refused to extend the Henry deci-
69. See infra notes 71-92 and accompanying text (discussing other circuit court decisions
that have addressed sixth amendment agency issue).
70. Id.
71. 680 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 1163-64. In Malik, the defendant voluntarily described his heroin-smuggling opera-
tion to a fellow inmate. Id. The inmate later informed the FBI of the defendant's incriminating
statements. Id. The inmate originally planned to join the defendant in the smuggling scheme
but decided that he stood to gain more by informing on the defendant. Id. at 1165.
73. Id. In Malik, the FBI previously had employed the informant to provide information
about stolen property. Id. at 1163. The FBI then learned of outstanding warrants for the infor-
mant's arrest in connection with bank robberies in Scotland. Id. at 1163-64. The FBI terminated
the informant's agency status and imprisoned him. Id. at 1164. The facts adduced at trial showed
that the informant was bitter about the turn of events. Id. The informant, therefore, was not
likely to obtain incriminating statements from the defendant in cooperation with the government. Id.
74. Id. In Malik, the Seventh Circuit refused to set aside the district court's factual finding
that the informant was not a government agent at the time that the defendant incriminated himself.
Id. The Malik court applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id.; see United States
v. Sells, 496 F.2d 912, 913-14 (7th Cir. 1974) (substantial factual support for findings of district
court precludes circuit court reversal).
75. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71 (1980) (government payment of infor-
mant on contingent-fee basis motivates informant to seek information from defendant).
76. Compare United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1163 (7th Cir. 1982) (government
previously had paid informant for providing information) with Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132,
133 (4th Cir. 1983) (informant had no agreement with government to provide information).
77. 680 F.2d at 1165. In Malik, the court decided that the informant ceased being an agent
of the government at the time of his imprisonment. Id. at 1163.
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sion to situations in which a volunteer informant independently obtains in-
criminating evidence from a defendant.78
In United States v. Surridge,"9 the Eighth Circuit also held admissible the
testimony of an informant because the informant acted independently rather
than as a government agent.8" In Surridge, a friend visited and talked with
the defendant while the defendant was in police custody for bank robbery.8 '
The friend repeated the defendant's damaging admissions to the police.82
Although the Eighth Circuit held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
had not attached, the Surridge court addressed the sixth amendment agency
issue in dicta.8 3
The Surridge court observed that the friend was not a government agent
because no prearrangement existed between the police and the friend. 4 The
Eighth Circuit noted that the government did not direct the conversation and
that the friend voluntarily offered to testify. The Surridge court, therefore,
explained that the friend did not operate as a government agent for the same
reasons that the Thomas court determined that the admission of Gregory's
testimony was not violative of the sixth amendment as interpreted by Henry.86
78. Id. at 1165. The Malik court refused to interpret the sixth amendment and the Supreme
Court's decision in Henry as requiring the government to segregate potential informants from
other inmates. Id.
79. 687 F.2d 250 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 465 (1982).
80. Id. at 252.
81. Id. In Surridge, the police provided the defendant and his friend with a room, coffee
and doughnuts. Id. The defendant told his friend that he had participated in the robbery. Id.
The defendant also divulged the location of the stolen money. Id. The police attempted to record
the conversation surreptitiously, but failed because of a technical malfunction. Id.
82. Id. In Surridge, the friend voluntarily informed the police of the defendant's confes-
sion and the location of the money. Id.
83. Id. at 252-53. In Surridge, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby
v. Illinois for the proposition that sixth amendment guarantees do not apply until the government
has initiated judicial proceedings against the defendant. Id. at 253; see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1972) (commencement of judicial proceedings marks point at which sixth amend-
ment protections attach); supra note 4 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Kirby). In Sur-
ridge, the Eighth Circuit nonetheless enunciated its reasons for deciding that the informant was
not a government agent. 687 F.2d at 255.
84. 687 F.2d at 252.
85. Id. at 255. The Surridge court stressed that the police exercised no direction or control
over the conversation. Id. The court said that the government does not violate the sixth amend-
ment when a private citizen subjects a defendant to an interrogation in which the government
does not take part. Id.
The Surridge court noted that since the defendant was out of jail, the government had less
control over the conversation between the defendant and his friend. Id. at 252. Although the
focus of the agency question is on the relationship between the informant and the government,
the absence of confinement lessens government control over the circumstances under which the
defendant incriminates himself. Id.; see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (con-
finement imposes subtle influences upon accused to talk). The Surridge decision therefore is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's inclusion of confinement as a relevant factor for determining
whether an informant is a government agent. See 447 U.S. at 273-74 n.11 (custody may bear
upon whether government deliberately elicited statements from defendant).
86. 687 F.2d at 255. The Eighth Circuit in Surridge, like the Seventh Circuit in Malik,
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The Thomas decision draws additional support from United States v.
Calder,87 in which the Second Circuit held admissible the voluntary testimony
of an inmate-informant. 8  The defendant in Calder confided to a fellow in-
mate that he had extorted money from several taverns.8 9 The inmate testified
at the defendant's trial for extortion that the defendant admitted participating
in the crime.90 Like the Fourth Circuit in Thomas, the Calder court cited Henry
for the proposition that admission of the testimony of a neutral cellmate was
not unconstitutional.9 Since the Calder informant had no agreement with the
government to obtain information, the Second Circuit ruled that admission
of the informant's testimony did not abridge the sixth amendment. 92 The Calder
court's analysis that Henry does not require the disqualification of a neutral
inmate witness, therefore, is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's analysis in
Thomas.
93
To constitute a violation of a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel,
the federal judiciary requires that evidence clearly demonstrate that an infor-
mant acted under government control or on a quidpro quo basis. 94 For exam-
ple, the testimony of an informant whose probationary freedom hinges on
the successful production of incriminating evidence is inadmissible.9s Likewise,
courts must exclude the testimony of an informant who operates under govern-
refused to require police to prevent private citizens from volunteering testimony about a defen-
dant's statements. Id.; see also Malik v. United States, 680 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982) (sixth
amendment does not prohibit government use of evidence obtained from defendant by self-initiated
informant).
87. 641 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
88. Id. at 79.
89. Id. at 78.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 79. The Calder court held the informant's testimony admissible because the in-
formant was a neutral witness. Id.; see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (Henry
decision implicitly supports admission of neutral inmate's testimony in Thomas); United States
ex rel. Milani v. Pate, 425 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir.) (voluntary postindictment confession indiscreetly
made to fellow inmate is admissible when inmate was not government agent at time defendant
confessed to him), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); Stowers v. United States, 351 F.2d 301,
302 (9th Cir. 1965) (same).
92. 641 F.2d at 79; see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing Second Cir-
cuit's analysis in Calder).
93. See Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Calder for proposition
that ongoing cooperation between witness and state must be present before sixth amendment
right to counsel attaches).
94. See supra notes 68-92 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court decisions that
have analyzed whether informant has acted as agent of government).
95. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Sampol, the informant
was an inmate awaiting parole. Id. at 630. Authorities informed the inmate that the parole board
would learn of any assistance he rendered in regard to the defendant's case. Id. The inmate in-
gratiated himself with, and obtained incriminating statements from, the defendant. Id. The govern-
ment granted the informant early parole and convicted the defendant with the aid of the infor-
mant's testimony. Id. at 642-43. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Henry, the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the informant's actions clearly were attributable to the govern-
ment. Id. at 643. The Sampol court, therefore, overturned the defendant's conviction because
the government had violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel by using the infor-
mant's testimony to convict the defendant. Id.
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